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DEAF PRISON INMATES: TIME TO BE HEARD
Bonnie P. Tucker*
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of deaf people in the United States utilizes American
Sign Language (ASL) as their primary mode of communication.' ASL is
a completely different language from English, that has its own grammar
and syntax2 and is based on the use of signs representing a limited
number of primarily concrete terms. Because the average deaf high
school graduate reads and writes at the fourth grade level,3 many deaf
Americans have limited knowledge of the rules of English grammar and
do not use English grammar even when writing.4 By way of example, a
person signing or writing in ASL might state "[y]our true most need tell
me must," while an English speaking person would state "[y]ou must tell
me what you really need most;"5 a person signing or writing in ASL
might ask "[tiouch San Francisco already you?", while an English speak-
* Partner, Brown & Bain, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona; Associate Professor of Law, Arizona
State University College of Law, Tempe, Arizona. The author wants to express utmost grati-
tude to David H. Kaye, whose many insightful and thought provoking comments on various
drafts of this article were invaluable. The helpful comments of Ralph Spritzer, Gary Lowen-
thal and Alan Matheson are also appreciated.
1. See, e.g., H. SCHLESINGER & K. MEADOW, SOUND AND SIGN: CHILDHOOD DEAF-
NESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 4 (1972); J.K. KRESSE & P. KLEVEN, DEAF PEOPLE AND SIGN
LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS IN COURT: A BOOKLET FOR BENCH AND BAR (1981) [hereinafter
KRESSE & KLEVEN].
2. See, e.g., R. BATrISON, LEXICAL BORROWING IN AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE 92
(1978) (American Sign Language is "a separate language with a separate historical tradition,
and separate morphological and syntactic principles of organization"); KRESSE & KLEVEN,
supra note 1, at 4 (American Sign Language is "a complete language which is separate and not
dependent upon English for its meaning and bears no structural resemblance to English."). As
one author has explained: For example, ASL qualifiers generally follow rather than precede
the noun as in English; events are normally placed in chronological order; cause and effect
relationships are generally stated in the form of rhetorical questions; and conditional phrases
are usually placed last in a sentence. Id. at 11.
3. OFFICE OF DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES, GALLAUDET COLLEGE, ACADEMIC ACHIEVE-
MENT TEST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL TESTING PROGRAM FOR HEARING IMPAIRED STU-
DENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Spring 1981) (the average 18-year old deaf person reads at the
fourth grade level); P.W. OGDEN AND S. LIPSETr, THE SILENT GARDEN: UNDERSTANDING
THE HEARING-IMPAIRED CHILD 94 (1982) ("Most deaf high school graduates read at a
fourth-grade level, even today.").
4. See, eg., KRESSE & KLEVEN, supra note 1, at 6-7.
5. Id. at 7.
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ing person would ask "[h]ave you been to San Francisco? ',6
Deaf people in America comprise "a distinctly separate subculture
in our society - a culture with its own language, social hierarchy and
values." 7 While the existence of a deaf subculture is based on a variety of
factors, the most significant are that: (1) the majority of deaf people
share a common, unique language; and (2) deaf people often attend seg-
regated state (or private) schools for the deaf, where their separate cul-
tural values and concepts are developed and passed from one generation
to the next.' Deaf people frequently view themselves as "outsiders in a
hearing world" and thus "often form tightly knit groups that are reluc-
tant to interact with the hearing world except when necessary ....
Because of their linguistic and cultural differences, deaf people face
problems in every area of their lives, including social situations, employ-
ment and education, that are unimaginable to members of the hearing
world. The following stories about simple situations involving deaf peo-
ple embroiled in our criminal justice system serve to illustrate the
breadth of the problems confronting many deaf Americans:
1. A deaf man was sentenced to one year in jail. Four months
prior to the time his term expired, the prisoner was sent written data
informing him that he was eligible for parole and if he wished to avail
himself of that opportunity he should request a hearing before the parole
board. The deaf prisoner's primary language, however, was ASL. Be-
cause "there are no signs for many legal terms,""0 and because of the
abstract nature of the word "parole," the prisoner did not comprehend
6. Shipley, The Deaf Witness, 14 Litigation 13 (1987).
7. KRESSE & KLEVEN, supra note 1, at 3. See also Shipley, supra note 6, at 13 ("[tjhe
Deaf community is a culturally distinct group with its own language, values, and sense of
history. The Deaf community sees itself as a minority group. That is why Deaf people capital-
ize Deafness-it unabashedly marks them as an ethnic group").
8. There are numerous books and articles discussing the deaf sub-culture. For a good
overview of the subject, see B. BENDERLY, DANCING WrrIouT Music: DEAFNESS IN
AMERICA (1980); P.W. OGDEN & S. LiPsETr, supra note 3.
Deaf people have their own newspapers, such as The Silent News, published in Buffalo,
New York, which has over 72,000 readers, their own Deaf Olympics, and their own "Miss
Deaf America" contest. The Bicultural Center was recently formed in Riverdale, Maryland
for the purpose of "recognizing Deaf people as a social and linguistic minority that has been
frequently abused, misunderstood, or ignored by the Hearing majority." The Silent News,
February 1988, at 28, col. 1. There are many projects aimed at "[e]nhancing the Deaf [c]ulture
[c]urricula for Deaf students." See, eg., The Silent News, February 1988, at 29, col. 1; see also
Silver, In And Out Of Culture: The Role and Meaning of Deaf History, The Silent News,
February 1988, at 27, col. 1. Washington, D.C. has, for fourteen years, given recognition to
"Deaf Heritage Week," which was celebrated most recently during the week of December 6-
12, 1987.
9. Shipley, supra note 6, at 13.
10. Id. at 14.
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that word, and was generally unable to understand the language of the
official documents. Because a qualified interpreter was not provided to
explain to the prisoner the concept of parole, and to explain the pris-
oner's rights, the prisoner remained in jail for an additional four months
until his one year sentence expired. 1'
2. A deaf driver was pulled over by the police for committing a
minor traffic violation. As the police approached the back of the stopped
vehicle they observed beer cans in the back of the car and thought they
had probable cause to believe the driver might be intoxicated. While still
standing behind the car the policemen ordered the driver to exit his vehi-
cle with his arms over his head. Being unable to hear the policemen, the
driver did not exit. The policemen, therefore, pulled the man out of the
car and twisted his arms behind his back, dislocating one shoulder. After
explaining to the policemen via gestures that he was deaf, the driver was
taken to the police department for a breath test. He was handed the
breathylizer equipment and told to "blow." He blew. Unfortunately, he
did not blow "hard" enough and thus he was orally instructed to blow
"harder." The deaf man, however, did not comprehend the abstract term
"harder,' 12 and thus failed to follow instructions. Accordingly, the po-
lice reported that the deaf driver "refused to take a breath test," and
pursuant to the applicable law 3 the deaf driver's license was revoked for
six months.'
4
3. Late one evening two men were observed by a policeman to be
fighting on the street in front of an apartment building. The policeman
broke up the fight and attempted to question the two men. Because one
of the men was deaf and communicated solely via ASL, the policeman
was unable to communicate with that man. Based upon the hearing
man's version of the fight, however, the policeman arrested the deaf man
for assault and placed him in the local jail. After spending the night in
jail the deaf man attended a preliminary hearing before the local magis-
trate, accompanied by a qualified sign language interpreter. After listen-
11. Reported by Helen Young, nationally certified interpreter for the deaf, Phoenix,
Arizona.
12. The term "hard" represents something concrete, such as a rock. To the converse, the
term "harder," as in "blow harder," represents an abstract concept. Such abstract concepts
are often unfathomable to deaf persons who communicate in sign language, which is based on
a limited number of signs representative of a relatively small number of concrete words.
13. ARiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 28-691(D).
14. Subsequently the deaf driver obtained the services of a qualified interpreter and took
the matter to court. The hearing examiner, after listening to testimony from an expert in ASL
explaining why the deaf man did not understand the meaning of the term "harder," vacated
the suspension. Reported by Helen Young, nationally certified legal interpreter for the deaf,
Phoenix. Arizona.
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ing to the deaf man's story, as presented through the interpreter, the
magistrate dismissed the charges and upbraided the policeman for im-
properly making a decision to arrest the deaf man based on only one side
of the story.1
5
As commentators have noted, "even basic legal terms and concepts
are likely to be beyond comprehension for the many deaf people pos-
sessed of minimal English skills. Sometimes the lack of communication
can be even more basic: In at least one instance a [California] court is-
sued a bench warrant for a deaf person who was present in the court-
room but did not know his case had been called."'
16
The language and cultural differences of most deaf Americans have
particularly severe ramifications for deaf prison inmates. Consider the
following hypothetical case, which is based on facts derived from actual
cases:
17
Two brothers, John and Fred Doe, agreed to rob a local bank. John
entered the bank and pulled a gun on the teller who was "persuaded" to
give approximately fifty thousand dollars to John. John then fled from
the bank in a car driven by Fred. John and Fred were captured and
convicted of armed robbery. Each was sentenced to ten years in prison.
John can hear. Fred, however, is profoundly deaf, and communicates
through the use of ASL. Nevertheless, both men followed identical pro-
15. Reported by Helen Young, nationally certified interpreter for the deaf, Phoenix, Ari-
zona. A similar problem sometimes occurs when two drivers, one deaf and one hearing, are
involved in a car accident. Frequently the police ticket the deaf driver based on the one-sided
"facts" provided by the hearing driver, who is the only person able to communicate with the
police. Id.
Comparable problems arise in civil cases. For example, a state Department of Economic
Security (DES) held a custody hearing to determine whether two children should be placed in
the custody of their mother or their father. The mother was deaf. During the case manage-
ment hearing to determine placement of the children a qualified interpreter was not provided
for the deaf mother. Rather, a DES staff person, who had limited knowledge of sign language,
was asked to interpret. Due to the limited abilities of the "interpreter," the mother was unable
to understand the proceedings. Accordingly, the mother became frustrated and agitated. The
DES caseworker termed the mother uncooperative and custody of the children was awarded to
the father.
In another case involving the DES, authorities went to interview a deaf child who was
allegedly molested by one of the members of her foster family. The authorities did not provide
the child with a qualified interpreter, but relied solely on the biased "interpretation" provided
by the child's foster mother. Id.
16. KRESSE & KLEViZ4, supra note 1, at 7. While an explanation of the full extent of the
language and cultural difficulties facing deaf people is beyond the scope of this article, for those
who are interested, a summary of an ongoing criminal case involving a deaf suspect, which
graphically illustrates the scope of these difficulties, is contained in the Appendix.
17. This hypothetical, although based on true cases involving current prison conditions, is
not meant to be strictly representative of any one case; it is merely intended to illustrate the
enormous disparity in the nature of prison life endured by hearing and deaf inmates.
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cedural steps through the criminal justice system, from interrogation and
meetings with lawyers to temporary incarceration and trial. Once con-
victed, both men entered the doors of the same prison to serve the same
amount of time under lock and key for having committed the same
crime.
During the procedural stages of his arrest and conviction John was
fully aware and informed of what was happening within the criminal jus-
tice system. Before being interrogated John was given standard Miranda
warnings, which he clearly understood. Therefore, John refused to an-
swer questions posed by the police and requested the assistance of an
attorney. John developed a rapport with his lawyer, who kept him in-
formed of the progress of his case.
Fred, however, had very little comprehension of what was happen-
ing within the criminal justice process. Fred was unable to converse with
the police who arrested him and took him into custody, and was not
provided with the services of an interpreter who understood his native
language, ASL. He was unable to understand the Miranda warnings
given him,"8 and lacked the familiarity of criminal justice procedures that
hearing people commonly obtain from movies, television and books.19
He was unable to find an attorney who understood sign language, and
thus his communications with his attorney were very limited.2" Unaware
of the status of his case-and of what would happen to him-Fred was
bewildered and frightened.2" Due to limited financial resources, John
and Fred were unable to pay the bail imposed by the court, and both
were held injail pending trial. John was placed among the general prison
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-30 (Appendix).
19. Letter from Beth A. Munson, a paralegal assisting an attorney in representing a deaf
client in California courts, to the author (Nov. 25, 1987) at 2.
20. As stated by one commentator:
How does a deaf person in a criminal situation locate an attorney who understands
his particular difficulties? Does he have employment which gives him sufficient re-
sources to afford the kind of attention he requires and is entitled to receive? Commu-
nication is much more time consuming and attorneys usually bill by the hour in
criminal cases. Unless the attorney has a paralegal interpreter or a paralegal familiar
with the use of a TDD, a deaf individual may have to pay three times as much to
achieve the same results which are obtained in attorney-client communications with
a hearing client. An interpreter will have to be obtained and utilized, not only in
court, but in most attorney-client interviews. Will the attorney or the client be aware
of what can be charged to the court for that service? Should the deaf client accept
court appointed representation and be content with the time and effort over-worked
and under-compensated court appointed counsel may be able to provide? A deaf
client who cannot afford retained counsel is not likely to find an appointed attorney
who will have the appropriate staff or resources, or be able to devote the amount of
time necessary for adequate communication.
Munson letter, supra note 19, at 3.
21. Id. at 2.
November 1988]
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population. Due to his deafness, however, Fred was held in "protective
custody" for several weeks; prison officials did not want to risk the possi-
bility that other inmates might harm Fred.22 A sign was taped on his cell
door labeling him as a "DEAF MUTE," and Fred felt as though he "was
being treated like a zoo animal on display to passers-by."23 While being
held in "protective custody" Fred remained in total isolation. He ate his
meals alone in his cell; he was prohibited from exercising with the other
men; he could not see a clock or the movements of the other inmates in
the day room; he could not watch television. 24 He "was taken to shower
and shave based on the availability of the guards," and, when the guards
were busy, sometimes days would pass between such trips.2"
Once convicted, John and Fred were placed in separate wards of the
prison. John immediately attempted to create a niche for himself in this
hostile environment. He learned which of his fellow inmates he wished
to spend time with or avoid. He learned which of the guards were and
were not trusted by the prisoners. He developed friendships with a few
inmates. It did not take John long to learn the prison ropes; to learn how
to avoid trouble and how to take maximum advantage of the few positive
aspects of prison life. Recognizing the probability of attack by some of
the more aggressive and sociopathic prisoners, John was constantly on
his guard. When he heard people approaching behind him he was care-
ful to place himself in a relatively safe position. When he heard loud
arguments or fights he moved as far away from the noise as possible so as
to avoid being caught up in the fracas.
John applied to work in one of several of the prison industries in
which prisoners are trained in a specialized trade and then given jobs
practicing that trade within the prison. Those fortunate prisoners re-
ceived the highest wages paid to prison employees. As a prerequisite to
obtaining such a position, John was required to take the Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT) and obtain a stated score. John successfully passed the
exam and was enrolled in an automotive mechanics class; subsequently
he was employed as a mechanic in the prison industries.
Because John has a history of alcohol abuse, he enrolled in an Al-
coholics Anonymous (AA) program at the prison. John also enrolled in
a "Dove" program, where prisoners who come from families where do-
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. As explained by Ms. Munson, her deaf client subsequently "marked out the word
'MUTE,'... complan[ing]... that it was an insulting label equivalent in offensiveness to the
word 'nigger' to a black person." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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mestic violence has been prevalent receive counseling. In addition, John
attended occasional lectures and classes on various other subjects, and
sometimes went to church services in the prison chapel.
During periods of free time John watched television in the prisoners'
day room and chatted with fellow prisoners. When in his cell he listened
to his personal radio via individual earphones. John had ready access to
the telephone in the day room, although his calls were limited to a strict
time period of 15 minutes each. Once a week he was allowed to see visi-
tors, whose visits were limited to one hour each. While John found
prison to be a pretty miserable place, he did what he could to make his
living conditions bearable.
Fred, to the contrary, could do very little to make his living condi-
tions bearable. Immediately following imposition of his sentence Fred
learned that the hazards of being a deaf prisoner were not limited to pre-
trial, incarceration. At the onset of their sentences Fred and John had
been placed in a temporary "holding" facility where they were separately
evaluated by a team of prison officials for purposes of determining their
appropriate prison placement. Fred was not provided the assistance of
an interpreter during the placement meetings, and was thus unable to
offer any input at those meetings or to understand what was discussed or
resolved therein. Immediately upon his arrival in the permanent prison
unit to which he was assigned, Fred's hearing aid26 was removed and-was
not returned for approximately two months.27 Very soon after his hear-
26. Most hearing-impaired people wear hearing aids. While the aids do not allow pro-
foundly deaf individuals to hear speech or most of the sounds that hearing people take for
granted in their everyday lives, they do-to differing- degrees-provide a certain amount of
background noise for profoundly deaf people, which in turn fosters a feeling of being part of
the environment, and assists profoundly deaf people in a limited degree to be aware of what is
happening around them.
27. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Melissa Meadows v. Sheriff Charles Foti, (No. 83-
4941) (E.D. La. 1983) [hereinafter Meadow's Complaint] (despite objections, hearing aid of
deaf inmate removed during the intake procedure in New Orleans Correctional Center and not
returned until one week after the inmate was released from confinement). See also Letter from
Richard L. Lancaster, an inmate in the Arizona State Prison'Complex, Douglas, Arizona, to
the author (Nov. 20, 1987) at 2 (severely hearing impaired prisoner who wears eye glasses with
a built-in hearing aid required to surrender glasses/aid upon being booked in jail. The glasses/
aid were subsequently returned damaged, and the prisoner's hearing aid mold was lost. The
prisoner was without benefit of the aid for an extended period of time until he was transported
in chains to a public clinic to be fitted for a new mold and until the aid was repaired).
Another difficulty involves the inability of deaf prisoners to obtain hearing aids. See, e.g.,
letter from William Herndon, an inmate at the Arizona State Prison Complex, Florence, Ari-
zona, to the author (Nov. 20, 1987) (hearing impaired prisoner has unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain a hearing aid for four months); letter from John Head, an inmate at the Arizona State
Prison Complex, Tucson, Arizona, to the author (Nov. 29, 1987) ("it took 5 [five] years for
[the Department of Corrections] to get me [a] hearing aid").
November 1988]
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ing aid was returned Fred developed problems with his ear mold, and
required a new mold. 8 Because a new ear mold could not be obtained
without a court order, it took several months before Fred obtained a new
mold and was able to wear his returned hearing aid.2 9
Shortly after his admission to prison Fred was interviewed by the
prison psychiatrist. Fred managed to communicate via gestures and
notes that it was frightening to be unable to communicate in prison-and
more particularly to be unable to communicate with the psychiatrist.
Although Fred made it clear that he required the services of a sign lan-
guage interpreter trained in his native language, ASL, to interpret the
interview, Fred's request was denied. Due to his fear and frustration,
Fred became very agitated; consequently, he was ordered placed in soli-
tary confinement and medicatedA0 Two days later, after Fred's repeated
requests for an interpreter were ignored, Fred was taken to his cell in the
general prison population.
Fred was unable to create a niche for himself in prison. Because
Fred is unable to speak or to hear his fellow inmates or the guards speak,
he remained virtually isolated from everyone else in the prison. He was
never able to develop friendships with other inmates. While a few pris-
oners would, on occasion, write notes back and forth with Fred, the pro-
cess was so laborious that most of the time the prisoners would not
bother. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Fred has little
knowledge of English grammar and reads and writes at the fourth grade
level.31 Thus, his ability to communicate by writing and reading written
notes is very limited. Because a sentence written in ASL may not appear
literate to an English speaking person, and vice versa, Fred and his fellow
inmates were often unable to understand each others' written
communications. 2
28. Ear molds are specially fitted for each individual hearing aid user. They are usually
made by an audiologist or an otorhinolaryngologist, who makes a wax impression of the ear
canal and has the ear mold built from that impression (similar to the manner in which molds
for dentures and dental bridges are made).
29. Telephone conversation between the author and Rita Spenser, mother of a deaf suspect
in the Maricopa County Jail, Phoenix, Arizona; letter from Chris Gallino, an inmate at the
Maricopa County Jail, Phoenix, Arizona, to the author (Nov. 1987).
30. See, eg., Meadow's Complaint, supra note 27, at 6-7 (deaf female prisoner, who was
interviewed by a prison psychiatrist without an interpreter as repeatedly requested, stripped of
all clothing and bedcovers, placed in solitary confinement, medicated against her will and ob-
served by male and female prison employees).
31. See supra text accompanying note 3.
32. Following is an excerpt from a letter written by a deaf (adult) prisoner whose primary
language is ASL. The letter is typical of the written communications of deaf high school
graduates whose native language is ASL:
On Sept. 25, 1986 CPS Dan Moe and Tim Crowley was decision with me by TDD
[Vol. 22:1
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Fred's days in prison were fraught with frustration and fear. He
was not able to develop any real understanding of the prison ropes. He
was often unable to prevent attacks against himself by other prisoners
and, as an easy prey, was frequently the victim of such attacks. 3 He was
routinely taunted and tormented by many inmates and a few guards.
Yet, when he defended himself, and was subsequently ordered before a
disciplinary board, he was denied the right to an interpreter at the disci-
and no way interpreter, that decision for move to minium at San Pedro. And I wait
for a month later then they answer denies for minium. I not understand why denies.
I found out reason why they denies me for minium due to problem on yard and give
me high score is 4/0 on Sept. 1986, I found out that without interview with me
decision about score is 4/0 1 had no know about interview until later in Feb. 1987.
On March 13, 1987 [i]nterview with ICC by John Morrow and other CPO deci-
sion with me TDD ... John Morrow know in law say must be interpreter to come
with me on decision and John information with Jim McLaughlin to make application
to someone but no show up come on time and keep continue talk with me by TDD. I
not complain against John Morrow, I understand what he know and tries to pro-
vided an interpreter.
Letter from Nicki Boner, a deaf inmate at Perryville Prison, Arizona, to the author (Aug. 26,
1987).
33. One prisoner attested, under oath, when discussing a co-prisoner who is deaf and suf-
fers from tunnel vision:
People here in prison steal things right out from under him; [t]he guards... ignore
[the deaf inmate] all the time to include when he is literally beaten up, when he is
stolen from, when he shows them documents to prove his handicaps, and when he
needs to make TDD phone calls... ; I have seen people take [the deaf inmate's] food
right off his tray in the chow hall, and the guards laugh ....
Affidavit of Jay R. Sheats, an inmate at Perryville Prison, Arizona, May 18, 1987, attached to
plaintiff's response to defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgement in Bonner v.
Lewis, Phx. CLH (MS) (No. 86-1771) (1987).
As one deaf inmate has stated:
[H]ow can you avoid an attack when you can't hear an exchange of heated words or
[an attacker's] approach on foot? Deaf inmates do not have the ability to hear of any
anticipated trouble or fight starting before it becomes full scale, unless our eyes per-
ceive trouble ahead of us. Deaf inmates inadvertently get involved where life can
become endangered. If only we could hear, we'd have simply avoided trouble.
Interview with Steven Alan Turner by Ann Silver, The Silent News, Mar. 1987, at 28, col. 4.
A legal professional, discussing the plight of her deaf client, noted that during "four
months [spent] in [a prison] facility, [our client] has been beaten up, jumped from behind and
attacked by a deranged inmate while sweeping a hall, teased and tormented, and he has been
unable to establish even one on-going non-threatening relationship within the facility." Mun-
son letter, supra, note 19, at 4.
As stated by program counselor Nelson Cintron at New York's Eastern Correctional Fa-
cility, a hearing or visually impaired inmate's biggest fear "is that he could be assaulted before
he realizes that he is in danger." Bell, N. Y Prison Lends its Handicapped Inmates a Hand, Los
Angeles Times, March 24, 1985, at 12, col. 1 [hereinafter L.A. Times, March 24, 1985].
Indeed, the United States Department of Justice expressly recognized the physical dan-
gers faced by handicapped prisoners. When promulgating regulations pursuant to section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Justice stated that prison officials "must be mind-
ful of the vulnerability of some handicapped inmates to physical and other abuse by other
inmates." 28 C.F.R. Part 42, Appendix B at 45 Fed. Reg. 37,630 (1980). See infra text ac-
companying notes 102-06.
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plinary hearing.34 He was labeled as "dummy" or as "deaf and dumb."35
Some of his fellow inmates were suspicious of his deafness, believing it to
be an act, a ploy for better treatment, or an attempt to be mysterious.
36
A couple of inmates repeatedly "tested" Fred's deafness by approaching
him from behind, lighting papers on fire, and sticking them in his back
pockets.37 In his isolation Fred did not know how to stop the attacks
without worsening his situation.38 In desperation Fred attempted to
teach one of the guards to finger spell.39 He was called a "rat" by some
prisoners and beaten for his purported "snitching." °
Like John, Fred applied to be trained in a specialized trade and to
work in one of the prison industries paying higher salaries. Unlike John,
however, Fred was unable to obtain the requisite SAT score to qualify.
Although Fred and John have approximately equal intelligence, because
of his limited knowledge of English, and because he only reads and writes
at a fourth grade level, Fred has great difficulty with standard achieve-
ment tests.4 ' Thus, Fred was obliged to work in the prison mess hall,
where he did not learn a trade and where he received minimal wages.42
Like John, Fred has a history of alcohol abuse and comes from a
family background involving domestic violence. Because the prison
would not provide Fred with an interpreter, however, he was unable to
34. See, e.g., Affidavit, supra note 33. Hard of hearing prisoners face related problems.
One hard of hearing prisoner wrote the author that during his term in prison "I got wrote up,
locked down [and] put in the hole because I did not obey a direct order which I never hear[d]."
Letter from John Head, an inmate at the Arizona State Prison Complex, Tucson, Arizona, to
the author (Nov. 29, 1987).
35. E.g., Turner, supra note 33, at 28, col. 4.
36. Munson letter, supra note 19, at 4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Finger spelling involves a process whereby signs made by an individual's fingers repre-
sent the various letters of the alphabet. Persons using ASL, for example, generally use finger
spelling to spell out proper names or words for which there are no generalized signs.
40. Turner, supra note 33, at 28; Munson letter, supra note 19, at 4.
41. Because most deaf people face this difficulty, deaf students are tested for achievement
in basic skills areas via a "Special Edition for Hearing Impaired Students of the 1973 Stanford
Achievement Test." Trybus & Karchmer, School Achievement Scores of Hearing Impaired
Children: National Data on Achievement Status and Growth Patterns, AM. ANNALS OF THE
DEAF 62-69 (1977); Wolk & Allen, A 5-Year Follow-up of Reading Comprehension Achieve-
ment of Hearing-Impaired Students in Special Education Programs, 18 J. OF SPEC. ED. 161
(1984).
42. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 33, at 28, col. 3, where Mr. Turner states that due to their
inability to obtain the requisite scores on the SAT and "[b]ecause the average deaf American
finishes high school with an average of 3rd grade or below, there is no way for deaf inmates to
do anything productive and beneficial in prison-to better themselves educationally and finan-
cially. This really puts a dent in deaf inmates' lives morally and mentally. They become
'double-handicapped.'" Id.
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attend AA or Dove meetings. For the same reason Fred was prevented
from attending church services, lectures or classes offered at the prison.
Because the televison in the prisoners' rec room was not equipped witha
decoder,43 Fred was unable to watch TV. Obviously he was unable to
listen to the radio. Thus, Fred's days were spent in total boredom and
frustration.
During most of his term of imprisonment the prison in which Fred
resided did not have a teletypewriter device (TDD),44 and thus Fred was
unable to use the telephone. During the end of Fred's term the prison
did obtain a TDD, but it was kept under lock and key in an administra-
tive office. Thus, Fred could only use the telephone when he was able to
persuade a guard to take him to the TDD. When he wished to make a
phone call, he was required to write a request stating his desire to use the
TDD, the time at which he wanted to use it, the identity of the person he
wished to call and the purpose of the call.45 The guards were frequently
too busy to take him to the TDD or simply refused to do so. When Fred
finally did manage to persuade a guard to escort him to the TDD, he was
still limited to the 15 minute time restriction, notwithstanding that his
access to the phone was severely restricted and that it takes twice as long
to type messages than to speak messages back and forth."
Fred looked forward to visiting hours each week. When he had a
visitor who was not fluent in ASL, however, he was forced to communi-
cate with that visitor without the assistance of an interpreter. Occasion-
ally a prison guard who knew how to finger spell would attempt to
interpret; more often than not Fred and his visitor attempted to write
notes to one another. Although both of these very primitive modes of
communication take at least three times as long as spoken communica-
tion, Fred's visitors were usually obligated to abide by the one-hour visi-
tation rule.47
At the prison to which John and Fred were sentenced, the prisoners'
daily lives were regulated via announcements made over a central loud-
speaker. At repeated intervals during the day announcements were made
43. A decoder is a device whereby closed captioned television shows are provided for hear-
ing-impaired persons on "line 21" of the television screen expressly reserved for that purpose.
In this manner a hearing-impaired person may read, rather than try to hear, the speech of the
television actors.
44. A TDD is a teletypewriter device for deaf persons, whereby the telephone receiver is
placed into two headset cups on a machine that resembles a typewriter with a video screen
(and sometimes a paper printout). The deaf person types a message on the keyboard which is
relayed to a party at the other end of the line who also has a TDD.
45. Munson letter, supra note 19, at 5.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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over the loudspeaker instructing the prisoners what to do and when and
how to do it. Fred did his best to follow his fellow inmates-to go where
they went and do what they did. Often, however, for one reason or an-
other Fred was not immediately aware of what the other prisoners were
doing. Sometimes he did not know whom to follow.
Everyday prison procedures were difficult. For example, the metal
doors on the prisoners' cells operated electronically. Prior to opening the
cell doors and moving the prisoners out, such as for meals, exercise, or
random searches, a guard announced over the loudspeaker that the doors
would be opened in 30 seconds. The prisoners were then required to exit
their cells within an additional 30 seconds. Fred tried to keep an eye on
his cell door so that he would see when it opened, since he could never be
certain when such an announcement was going to occur. When the
doors opened while Fred was sleeping or engrossed in reading a maga-
zine or letter, however, Fred was unaware that the cell door had opened
and closed. As a result, Fred was constantly in trouble with the prison
authorities.48
Once outside their cells, when moving from one area of the prison to
another, prisoners were required to pass through turnstiles located at
each entrance and exit of the various sections of the prison. A guard in a
central tower viewed the prisoner at the turnstile through a TV screen,
and a speaker was attached to the turnstile to allow communication be-
tween guard and prisoner. As a prisoner passed through a turnstile, he
was required to inform the guard (via the speaker) of his reasons for
entering or exiting that section of the prison and to answer any questions
the guard might choose to ask. Fred was frequently stranded inside the
turnstiles, causing him to incur both the guards' wrath and that of the
prisoners waiting in line behind him.49 Clearly, Fred's experiences and
circumstances as a criminal suspect and defendant were drastically differ-
48. Id. The letter stated:
Our client has appeared to be uncooperative and has gotten into trouble with guards
when they have failed to comprehend that his apparent disobedience was not a delib-
erate act, but the result of not being able to hear the announcements or being unable
to observe the movements of other prisoners and the opening of his cell door.
Id.
49. As stated by one deaf prisoner:
During my first two years [in prison], I had to face [the] humiliation and embarrass-
ment of being stranded inside the turnstiles, which in turn force[d] other inmates to
wait behind me. In order to get myself through, the waiting line behind me had to
become long enough to warrant notice by other guards patrolling within the area;
sometimes the inmates would chant to get the guard's attention. Once the guards
arrived and realize[d] what the problem [was], they'd notify the guard at the plaza
central tower via walkie-talkie and explain that my deafness [was] the cause of the
needless standstill.
Turner, supra note 33, at 28.
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ent, and much more harsh, from John's experiences and circumstances.
Just as clearly, once the prison doors shut behind them, there was little
similarity between the ten-year terms of punishment and rehabilitation
served by John and Fred. While both John and Fred were being pun-
ished for the same crime, Fred's actual punishment was substantially
more severe than John's. While John and Fred were both purportedly
being "rehabilitated," Fred was precluded from taking part in any of the
rehabilitative aspects of prison life, such as job training, counseling, or
religious activities. It cannot be fairly debated that there is no legitimate
basis in the criminal law for this distinction. Our criminal justice system
is based on the concept of blameworthiness,50 and Fred and John were
equally blameworthy for having committed the same crime. It would not
foster the deterrence or rehabilitation principles of criminal punish-
ment"' to punish Fred more severely than John; indeed, with respect to
the latter principle Fred was probably in greater need of rehabilitation
than John. But what is the solution?
50. "Criminal law is framed in terms of imposing punishment for bad conduct, rather than
of granting rewards for good conduct, [thus] the emphasis is more on the prevention of the
undesirable than on the encouragement of the desirable." W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, JR.,
CRiMINAL LAW, § 1.5 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., id. One commentator argues that the rationale of punishing for specific deter-
rence purposes-to reduce crime by changing the behavior of individual criminals-is not ap-
plicable to handicapped offenders. According to that commentator, most physically disabled
offenders tend not to engage in careers of crime, and once convicted of a crime are unlikely to
repeat the offense. Brenner, The Parameters of Cruelty: Application of Estelle v. Gamble to
Sentences Imposed upon the Physically Fragile Offender, 12 AM. i. CRIM. LAW 279, 321-22
(1984).
Even if the rationale of specific deterrence does apply to handicapped offenders, however,
the deterrent effect would probably not be increased by the heightened level of punishment
experienced by deaf inmates. Principles of general deterrence-which aim to reduce crime by
changing the behavior of the public at large-are equally.inapplicable with respect to requiring
enhanced punishment for handicapped prisoners. The general deterrence rationale is premised
on the theory that when members of the general public are made aware of the punishment for a
particular crime to be imposed upon similarly situated individuals they will be deterred from
committing that crime. Handicapped individuals, however, are not "similarly situated" to
non-handicapped individuals. Hearing people generally find it difficult, at best, to understand
the problems of deaf people, and would not comprehend the additional severity of the punish-
ment imposed upon deaf offenders. In any. event, since the increased severity of the punish-
ment imposed upon deaf offenders would not apply to non-handicapped individuals, even if the
latter were aware of the differences, and since the number of deaf offenders is so small (see
infra text accompanying note 236), general deterrence would not be fostered by the imposition
of greater sentences for deaf offenders. Finally, since deaf inmates are generally unable to par-
ticipate in the rehabilitative aspects of prison life the rehabilitative goals of punishment-
which seek to teach prisoners new forms of behavior and thereby reduce crime-would not be
fostered. Nor does punishing deaf offenders more severely than hearing offenders further the
retributive purpose of punishment, which seeks to ensure that wrongdoers get their just des-
serts. Why do deaf offenders deserve greater punishment than hearing offenders?
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Some advocates of "deaf rights" argue that, to accomplish the goal
of punishing deaf criminals to the same extent as hearing criminals, con-
victed deaf criminals should be sentenced to shorter prison terms than
hearing prisoners. One deaf prisoner has stated that he would like to see
"the judicial system cut[] 20% to 40% off the sentencing terms for deaf
convicts.., because deaf prisoners actually pay their price [a] hundred-
fold."52 A professional in the legal field has pursuasively argued that:
I think it is possible that deafness might mitigate, to some
extent, some conduct. Deaf individuals do not often have equal
input regarding what conduct is "normal" and may not have
the same opportunities to achieve acceptable standards of be-
havior. We accept other mitigating factors in the sentencing
procedure, why not consider the impact of deafness on a per-
son's character and behavior? A resolution to this dilemma
might be found in the pioneer intensive probation programs be-
ing implemented in some jurisdictions.53
This article argues that the sentences received by deaf offenders
should not differ in length or severity from the sentences received by
hearing offenders. To the contrary, it is axiomatic that deaf individuals
must be held to the same standards of conduct and accountability as all
other members of our society. To implement any theory of punishment
that holds or implies otherwise is unacceptable. First, such a compro-
mise would not address the underlying problem. While shorter or less
severe prison sentences might help to "equalize" the sentences to be
served by deaf and hearing prisoners, as deaf prisoners would suffer
much greater punishment for a shorter period of time, deaf criminals
would become further ostracized from the mainstream of society as a
result, as well as from other prisoners, who would not understand or
appreciate the shorter sentences. Second, the cultural and linguistic
voids that result in gaps in deaf persons' knowledge of acceptable, "nor-
mal" behavior must be addressed by our educational institutions, not by
our correctional institutions. The ultimate solution to the problem,
therefore, lies in equalizing-to the extent practicable-the conditions of
confinement for deaf and hearing prisoners. This article will explore
principles of law that bear on the rights of deaf prisoners to receive equal
treatment, and suggest means of remedying the unjust treatment pres-
52. Turner, supra note 33, at 29.
53. Munson letter, supra note 19, at 5.
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ently received by deaf prison inmates.5 4
II. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
To equalize the conditions of deaf and hearing prisoners we must
look to principles of anti-discrimination and equal protection. For two
reasons, however, traditional anti-discrimination and equal protection
principles are inapplicable to cases involving handicapped persons:
First, the legal concepts of "anti-discrimination" and "equal protec-
tion" are premised on the principle that it is wrong to treat similarly
situated individuals differently. These concepts have their roots in the
struggle of blacks to obtain the same status and rights afforded to non-
minority citizens of the United States.55 Because race does not create
any rational difference between individuals that relates to meaningful cri-
teria such as ability or qualification to perform a job, the law recognizes
that persons of different races may not be treated differently simply on
the basis of race. 6 Therefore, where race is at issue, anti-discrimination
and equal protection principles are fairly clear: because racial differences
tell us nothing about a person's ability or qualifications, different treat-
ment based on race is presumed to be a result of irrational prejudice or
hostility. Accordingly, such differences cannot justify different treatment
and any such treatment is impermissible.
When applying principles of anti-discrimination and equal protec-
tion to cases involving handicapped people, however, those principles
must be applied in situations in which persons being treated differently
are not always "similarly situated persons." For example, while an indi-
vidual's race bears no relationship to his or her ability to perform a par-
ticular job, an individual's handicap will frequently affect his ability to
54. The term "deaf prison inmates" is used here to refer to both pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners.
Although many of the principles discussed in this article may apply generally to all handi-
capped prisoners, this article will focus solely on the problems of deaf inmates for two reasons:
(1) for the sake of concreteness, and (2) because deaf people, due to their linguistic and cultural
differences, face different (and in some respects, more severe) problems, and require different
accommodations, than other handicapped prisoners.
55. See, e.g., Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term Forward: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976); Parmet, AIDS and the Limits ofDiscrimina-
tion Law, 15 J. LAw, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 61, 62 (1987).
56. The landmark case establishing the basis for modem discrimination law is Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Supreme Court held that "separate but
equal" educational facilities for black and white children are inherently unequal and thus vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 495. For a comprehensive review of the Supreme
Court cases discussing racial discrimination see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049 (1978).
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perform a job, since many handicapped people suffer some impairment of
function. In such cases, where persons are not similarly situated in all
material respects, the legal parameters of anti-discrimination and equal
protection principles are somewhat hazy. 7 Because differences based on
handicap do frequently tell us something about a person's ability or clas-
sification, and thus may justify different treatment in many cases, it can-
not be presumed that different treatment based on handicap is premised
on irrational prejudice or hostility. Therefore, different treatment based
on handicap may not always be impermissible. The dilemma, of course,
is how much recognition should be given to such differences. As one
commentator has noted, cases involving handicapped persons "raise per-
plexing issues about when the [Supreme] Court should permit public and
private decisionmakers to make the difference of handicap matter."58
The second reason why traditional anti-discrimination and equal
protection principles are inapplicable to cases involving handicapped per-
sons is that discrimination against handicapped people has different roots
than discrimination against members of other minority groups. As the
Supreme Court noted in Alexander v. Choate,5 9 Congress has recognized
that discrimination against the handicapped is "most often the product,
not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-
of benign neglect,"' and "[f]ederal agencies and commentators on the
plight of the handicapped.., have found that discrimination against the
handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than af-
firmative animus."" Similarly, the Tenth Circuit noted in Pushkin v.
57. As one commentator has noted:
The application of the anti-discrimination principle to issues other than race discrim-
ination... is fraught with difficulties. Great controversy has arisen, for example,
over what the principle requires with respect to pregnancy, a condition unique to
women. Do maternity leaves discriminate against men, who cannot obtain such
leaves, or do they enable women to achieve the same employment opportunities as
men have, thereby reducing discrimination against women? This problem of differ-
ence, or of how the anti-discrimination principle applies to groups that are differently
situated, has plagued attempts to use [federal anti-discrimination laws].
Parmet, supra note 55, at 62.
58. Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
Rnv. 10, 30 (1987). The author also noted that:
[t]he dilemma of difference appears unresolvable. The risk of non-neutrality - the
risk of discrimination - accompanies efforts both to ignore and to recognize differ-
ence in equal treatment and special treatment ....
Id. at 31.
59. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
60. Id. at 295.
61. Id. at 296. See also Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled,
74 GEo. L.J. 1435, 1439-40 (1986), which states:
Despite the history and continuing vestiges of invidious discrimination against
the handicapped, their situation clearly is not the same as that of victims of racial
[Vol. 22:1
November 1988] DEAF PRISON INMATES
Regents of the University of Colorado6 2 that, unlike other forms of dis-
crimination, discrimination against handicapped people rarely results
from a hostile discriminatory purpose, but "usually results from more
invidious causative elements and often occurs under the guise of ex-
tending a helping hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limita-
tions of handicapped persons."63 Because the underlying causes of
discrimination against handicapped people are different from the under-
lying causes of discrimination against other minorities, the means by
which we deal with those underlying causes should also be different.
In sum, the traditional legal methods for dealing with discrimina-
tion are not directly applicable to cases involving discrimination against
handicapped people. Traditional anti-discrimination and equal protec-
tion law is premised on the need to treat similarly situated people in a
similar manner. Further, discrimination against the handicapped has
different roots than other forms of discrimination. The importance of
this caveat will become obvious in the following analysis of the legal
rights of deaf prisoners."
III. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
The only federal law that bears on the substantive rights of deaf
prison inmates is section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,65 which prohibits
discrimination against handicapped persons by recipients of federal fi-
nancial assistance.66 Section 504 provides, in pertinent part:
discrimination. The very notion of "disability" or "handicap" implies inherent limi-
tations which, in many situations, do justify differential treatment of a disabled per-
son. In addition, some of the "stereotyping" that results in the exclusion of disabled
individuals from jobs or activities they could adequately perform stems from
noninvidious (but still sometimes erroneous) assumptions that limitations attributa-
ble to most people with a particular handicapping condition will apply to all individ-
uals with that condition, or from a well-intentioned, though often misplaced, concern
that certain activities would be detrimental to the particular disabled person. In
short, in contrast with the brutal history of racism in America, the treatment of the
disabled has reflected a complex mixture of stereotyping and sympathy, apprehen-
sion and accommodation.
d (footnotes omitted).
62. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 1385. Note, however, that "[tio be sure, well-catalogued instances of invidious
discrimination against the handicapped do exist." Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295 n.12 (citing
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abili-
ties, Ch. 2 (1983); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Op-
portunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69
CORNELL L. Rv. 401, 403 n.2 (1984)).
64. See, e.g., infra notes 113-14 and 129-31 and accompanying text.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
66. Federal laws and regulations that purport to relate specifically to prisons do not pro-
vide any substantive relief to deaf prison inmates. For example, the Civil Rights of Institution-
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No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency [of the United
States] .... 67
In accord with this statute, therefore, whether a deaf prison inmate
alized Persons' Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1982), empowers the Attorney General of the
United States to institute a civil action for equitable relief in a federal district court whenever
he has:
reasonable cause to believe that any state... is subjecting persons residing in or
confined to an institution [defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1)(B)(ii) as including a jail,
prison or other correctional facility] . . . to egregious or flagrant conditions which
deprive such persons of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous
harm, and that such deprivation is pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance to
the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges or immunities ....
42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (1982).
In addition, the Institutionalized Persons' Act allows the Attorney General to invervene
on behalf of the United States whenever:
an action has been commenced in any court of the United States seeking relief from
egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive persons residing in institutions of any
rights, privileges or immunities serviced or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States causing them to suffer grievous harm and the Attorney General has
reasonable cause to believe that such deprivation is pursuant to a pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities ....
42 U.S.C. § 1997(C)(a)(1) (1982).
While this Act would provide deaf prisoners with a procedural remedy for a violation of
substantive rights (assuming that the Attorney General could be persuaded to act on behalf of
such deaf prisoners), the Act does not define any substantive rights of prisoners, whether hand-
icapped or non-handicapped.
In addition, a regulation promulgated pursuant to the Civil Rights for Institutionalized
Persons' Act requires correctional institutions to create inmate grievance procedures, and re-
quires each institution to "ensure that the [grievance] procedure is accessible to impaired and
handicapped inmates." Minimum Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures, 28 C.F.R.
§ 40.4 (1987). Again, however, this regulation offers procedural protections to handicapped
inmates, but does not define any substantive rights of such inmates.
One federal regulation does purport to provide handicapped inmates in federal correc-
tional institutions with some substantive rights. Regulations promulgated by the Department
of Justice with respect to the Bureau of Prisons provide that:
Inmates may not be discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, nationality,
sex, handicap, or political belief. Each Warden shall ensure that administrative deci-
sions and work, housing, and program assignments are non-discriminatory.
Non-Discrimination Toward Inmates, 28 C.F.R. § 551.90 (1987) (emphasis added).
Although that regulation has been in effect since 1980, it does not appear to have been
utilized in any case to protect the rights of handicapped prisoners. Moreover, by its express
terms the regulation only protects the rights of inmates in federal prisons. See General Defini-
tions, 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (1987) ("As used in this chapter. . . '[i]nmate' means any person
who is... placed in or designated to be placed in, a [federal] Bureau of Prisons institution.").
67. 29 U.S.C. at § 794.
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will prevail on a claim that the applicable department of corrections vio-
lated section 504 by failing to make reasonable accommodations within a
correctional facility for his deafness will involve a determination of four
factors: (1) whether the prison is a recipient of federal financial assist-
ance; (2) whether the deaf inmate is an "otherwise qualified individual;"
(3) whether the general operations of the prison are classified as a "pro-
gram or activity" within the meaning of section 504; and (4) whether the
deaf inmate has been impermissibly discriminated against on the basis of
his handicap. Even if all of these factors were satisfied, however, the
"reasonable accommodation" standard under section 504 must be inter-
preted in such a manner as to require prison officials to provide deaf
prisoners with meaningful relief.
A. Requirement That the Prison Be a Recipient of
Federal Financial Assistance
Because section 504 only prohibits discrimination against handi-
capped persons by recipients of federal financial assistance, some prisons
may fall outside the scope of the Act. While no question exists with
respect to federal correctional institutions,68 whether a state or county
correctional facility will be viewed as a recipient of federal financial
assistance will be largely determined by the facts of each case. State and
local governments regularly receive federal grants, entitlement funds and
other federal assistance69 to be utilized within and among their correc-
tional departments and facilities. In such cases, state or local prison fa-
68. Section 504 was amended in 1978 by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982)). Among other things, the Amendments extended the non-discrimination mandate of
section 504 to programs and activities conducted by agencies of the federal government. Since
the Federal Bureau of Prisons is an agency of the federal government, federal prisons are
clearly subject to the mandate of section 504.
69. The regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to
section 504 define the term "Federal financial assistance" as including:
[A]ny grant, cooperative agreement, loan, contract (other than a direct Federal pro-
curement contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty), subgrant, contract under
a grant or any other arrangement by which the Department provides or otherwise
makes available assistance in the form of:
1. Funds;
2. Services of Federal personnel;
3. Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property, including:
(i) Transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market value or for re-
duced consideration; and
(ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if the Federal
share of its fair market value is not returned to the Federal Government.
4. Any other thing of value by way of grant, loan, contract or cooperative
agreement.
Definitions, 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(f) (1987).
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cilities receiving such assistance should usually, but will not always,
qualify as recipients of federal financial assistance within the meaning of
section 504.
In March, 1988, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987 (Restoration Act),70 which will have the effect of subjecting most
state prisons to the mandate of section 504. The Restoration Act was
passed to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v.
Bell,71 which held that only the specific program within an institution
that received federal funds, not the entire institution, was required to
comply with the anti-discrimination mandate of section 504.72 Prior to
the recent passage of the Restoration Act, if a state or county Depart-
ment of Corrections received federal funds, but did not specifically utilize
those funds for the particular correctional institution at issue (or perhaps
even for a particular program at issue within that correctional institu-
tion), that correctional facility was not required to comply with section
504.73 Following the passage of the Restoration Act, however, this "pro-
gram specificity" exemption created in Grove City College is no longer
applicable. Under the Restoration Act, the fact that specific prisons or
prison programs are not the actual recipients of federal financial assist-
ance received by the applicable Department of Corrections should be ir-
relevant for purposes of determining whether prison officials are subject
to the mandate of section 504.
One qualification, however, does remain. In order to qualify as a
recipient of federal financial assistance, the individual facility in question
would probably be required to be an actual or intended recipient of such
assistance. In United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed
70. PUB. L. No. 100-259, 102 STAT. 28 (1987).
71. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
72. Id at 569-70. Grove City College actually dealt with Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). Id at 557. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 636 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the ruling of Grove City College should also
apply to actions arising under section 504.
73. Grove City College enrolled a large number of students who received Federal Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 559. The Court held that
only the student financial aid office benefitted from that federal financial assistance, and thus
only the financial aid program, but not the entire college, was required to comply with Title
IX's proscription against sex discrimination. Id. at 571.
Under this reasoning, a prison director or director of a local or state Department of Cor-
rections could have argued that the federal financial assistance received by the prison was not
received by the particular "program" within the prison that was at issue with respect to the
deaf prisoner's complaint. Prior to the Restoration Act, under certain factual circumstances,
for example, it was possible to argue that a prison received federal financial assistance solely
for its work furlough program, and that therefore only the work furlough program should be
required to comply with section 504.
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Veterans of America,74 the Supreme Court held that only actual recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance, and not beneficiaries of such assist-
ance,, must comply with the anti-discrimination mandate of section 504.75
An example of a situation in which this ruling would become applicable
is a case in which neither the Department of Corrections nor the specific
correctional facility at issue was an actual recipient of federal financial
assistance, but the prison was merely the indirect beneficiary of such
assistance provided at large to the state or to a state agency other than
the state Department of Corrections. As a result of the recent passage of
the Restoration Act, however, relatively few prison facilities should be
held exempt from cormpliance with section 504 due to the lack of federal
financial assistance.
B. Requirement that the Deaf Prisoner Be an Otherwise Qualified
Handicapped Individual
It is indisputable that a deaf person is "handicapped" within the
meaning of section 504.76 It would also appear indisputable that any
handicapped person who has been involuntarily placed in a corrections
facility or prison, and who is required by law to remain in that facility or
prison, is "otherwise qualified" to be a prisoner, and is thus entitled to be
treated in a non-discriminatory manner. In Brauner v. McConnell,"
however, the court apparently found that fact disputable.
In Brauner, a paraplegic who was sentenced to jail in Jefferson
County, Kentucky filed an action claiming that the prison to which he
was sentenced was inaccessible to paraplegics. This, he claimed, violated
section 504. Mr. Brauner's complaint included allegations that: (1) due
to the inaccessibility of facilities he was unable to use the toilet or shower
facilities; and (2) while in maximum security he was deprived of his
wheelchair and was confined to and unable to move from his bunk. As a
result, he was required to lie in a supine position due to his inability to sit
74. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
75. The Court held that commercial airline carriers are not recipients of federal financial
assistance under section 504, even though the airports and the air traffic control systems uti-
lized by airlines are recipients of such assistance. Rather, the airlines are simply indirect bene-
ficiaries of the federal financial assistance provided to the airports and the air traflic control
systems. Id at 612.
76. The term "handicapped" is defined under section 504 as:
Any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such persons' major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impair-
ment, or (ill) is regarded as having such an impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).,
77. No. C84-0652-L(B) (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 1986), aff'd without opinion, 815 F.2d 701
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 343 (1987).
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up without a wheelchair or bars to support him. In rejecting Mr.
Brauner's section 504 claim, the district court stated: "[We are not] will-
ing to hold that a prisoner is an otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual. The question which immediately leaps to mind is: Otherwise
qualified to do what?""8 The district court's ruling was affirmed without
opinion by the Sixth Circuit,79 and the United States Supreme Court re-
cently denied certiorari.8" The basis of the district court's refusal in
Brauner to find a handicapped prisoner "otherwise qualified" is un-
fathomable. To the extent that the court ruled that the handicapped
prisoner in Brauner was not otherwise qualified to be a prisoner, that
ruling is directly contradictory to law. In Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis,81 the Supreme Court held that an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual is one who is qualified for the activity at issue "in spite of" his
handicap. If a handicapped person is not qualified to be a prisoner in
spite of his handicap, clearly he should not be required to be in prison.
Conversely, if a handicapped person is required to be in prison despite his
handicap, it must be assumed that he is qualified to be a prisoner regard-
less of that handicap. 2
C. The "Program or Activity" Requirement
The few courts that have considered the plight of handicapped pris-
oners within the context of section 504 have agreed that specific pro-
grams or activities within the prison, such as employment programs and
vocational training, constitute "programs or activities" under that stat-
ute. In Journey v. Vitek,"3 the Eighth Circuit considered a handicapped
prisoner's claim that he was discriminated against in violation of section
504 because he was denied access to rehabilitation or vocational services
within the prison. Mr. Journey was a paraplegic serving a twenty-one to
thirty-six year sentence in a Nebraska state prison. Journey claimed, in-
ter alia, that the Nebraska Department of Corrections violated section
78. Id. at 3.
79. 815 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1987).
80. 108 S. Ct. 343 (1987).
81. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
82. If the Brauner court did, in fact, hold that Mr. Brauner was not otherwise qualified to
be a prisoner, the effect of that ruling would be to permit, under section 504, every manner of
official discrimination against handicapped prisoners, including feeding such prisoners less
food or requiring them to wear stigmatizing armbands. Clearly, such a ruling is erroneous,
and should have little precedential value. Giving the Brauner court the benefit of the doubt,
however, perhaps the court was confusing the "otherwise qualified" issue with the question of
whether a program or activity was at issue, or with the question of whether Mr. Brauner was
discriminated against on the basis of handicap.
83. 685 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1982).
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504 by refusing to provide him with access to the second floor of the
prison, where the prison infirmary was located and where certain prison
activities were conducted. Because there were no ramps in the prison to
allow him to travel to the second floor, Journey asserted that he was
improperly deprived of participation in educational, rehabilitative, recre-
ational and employment programs within the prison. The Nebraska fed-
eral district court allowed Journey's section 504 action to proceed, but
held as a factual matter that section 504 had not been violated because
"[for the most part.., the prison personnel have afforded [Journey]
access to the activities in which he had interest, nearly as often as he
wanted to participate. ' '8 4 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the factual
findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous and thus affirmed
the decision below.8"
The district court in Journey apparently assumed that if the defend-
ants were recipients of federal financial assistance the educational, reha-
bilitative, recreational and employment programs within the prison
constituted "programs or activities" within the meaning of section 504.86
The court in Sites v. McKenzie 87 reached a similar conclusion. In Sites, a
prisoner claimed that the West Virginia Department of Corrections' de-
nial of vocational rehabilitation opportunities to allegedly mentally ill
prisoners incarcerated in prison violated section 504. The court stated as
follows:
Plaintiff has a record of mental impairment and certainly has
been regarded as having such. Furthermore, it has been admit-
ted that the West Virginia Department of Corrections is a re-
cipient of Federal financial assistance. Accordingly, any
exclusion of Plaintiff from participation in a vocational rehabili-
tation program simply because of his handicap is forbidden by
the Act.
88
84. Id. at 242.
85. Id.
86. The Eighth Circuit stated in Journey:
[t]he district court did not decide whether the phrase "any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance" in [section 504 of] the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 means the specific programs which were the subject of Journey's exclusion,
discrimination or denial of benefits or any program or activity of the Department of
Correctional Services. This issue we ... need not decide, as the district court's find-
ing assumes without deciding that if any Federal financial assistance went to the
Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, whether or not to a program from
which Journey has been excluded, denied benefits or been the subject of discrimina-
tion, that he has an action.
Id. at 242 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
87. 423 F. Supp. 1190 (W.D. W. Va. 1976).
88. Id. at 1197.
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Journey and Sites, however, do not specifically address the question
of whether the prison program as a whole (which includes general condi-
tions of confinement) constitutes a program or activity within the mean-
ing of section 504. In Brauner v. McConnell the district court answered
that specific question in the negative. The court first noted that, "[tihe
action is a novel one so far as our research has disclosed. The [c]ourt has
found actions in which handicapped prisoners are denied access to reha-
bilitation or vocational services, Journey v. Vitek, but we find no case
treating the precise issue before the [c]ourt."89 The court then opined
that "[t]hroughout all of the authorities [discussing section 504] the
[c]ourt has reviewed there runs a common thread of rehabilitation or
educational opportunities," and concluded that it would violate the legis-
lative intent of section 504 "to expand it to include involuntary incarcer-
ation within the definition of 'program or activity.' "90
When deciding Brauner, District Court Judge Thomas Ballantine
Jr. was apparently unaware of a case in the same Western District of
Kentucky, Kendrick v. Bland,91 in which District Court Judge Edward
H. Johnstone required prison officials of the Kentucky State Penitentiary
to submit a "study and plan." The-purpose of this "study and plan" was
to "correct any deficiency" with respect to the requirement that the
"physical barriers to the handicapped at its institution [be] in compliance
with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. "92 By imposing the j'equirements of
the Act, the court in Kendrick obviously recognized that the prison, as a
whole, constituted a program or activity under section 504, and was thus
required to be in compliance with section 504.93 Kendrick is in contrast
to the reasoning in Brauner. In Brauner, the court recognized that a
specific program within a prison constitutes a "program or activity" cov-
ered by section 504.94 At the same time, the Brauner court refused to
recognize the overall prison program as such a program or activity. Such
a finding defies logic.95
89. District Court's Order of March 25, 1986, supra note 77, at 3 (citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. 541 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
92. Id. at 40.
93. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 77.
95. In a recent case the Sixth Circuit again appeared to indicate confusion with respect to
the question of what prison programs or activities constitute a "program or activity" covered
by section 504. In Baker v. Seabold, 831 F.2d 293 (6th Cir. 1987), not recommended for full
text publication, 6th Cir. Rule 24 (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (vacating and remand-
ing the district court order), a deaf inmate at the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex in
Kentucky "filed a civil rights complaint alleging that the failure to provide him with an inter-
preter and a red warning light in his cell deprived him of rehabilitation opportunities at the
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Under the Brauner court's reasoning, a hospital run by a state that
received federal financial assistance for the purpose of maintaining or op-
erating the hospital would fail to qualify as a "program or activity" con-
ducted by the state, while specific programs or activities conducted by
the hospital would qualify as such programs or activities. In practical
terms, this would mean that, under section 504, the hospital could dis-
criminate with impunity among its patients with respect to its more gen-
eral activities (such as providing patients with beds, bathroom facilities
and food), but could not discriminate with respect to particular programs
provided to the patients (such as occupational or physical therapy or al-
cohol abuse programs). Similarly, under section 504, a prison director
could discriminate with impunity among prison inmates with respect to
general activities (such as by providing handicapped prisoners with less
food or inferior living conditions), but not with respect to specific activi-
ties (such as denying handicapped prisoners access to rehabilitation pro-
grams). Such hair splitting is nonsensical. The sole question with
respect to the "program or activity" requirement is whether the hospital
as a whole (or the prison as a whole) including the hospital's (or prison's)
specific activities, is a program or activity within the meaning of section
504. That question should be answered in the affirmative.
Section 504 was based on and modeled after the Civil Rights laws
prohibiting sex and race discrimination. It has been repeatedly termed
the "declaration of civil rights for the handicapped,"96 because "[ilts
terms purport to guarantee to handicapped individuals the same rights
afforded other minority or disadvantaged peoples under similar antidis-
crimination provisions."97 Indeed, the wording of section 504 is virtually
identical to that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits re-
cipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of
race or sex.9 8 Would the Brauner court hold that a prison that received
institution." The trial court dismissed the complaint as frivolous. In remanding the case to
the district court, the Sixth Circuit cited Journey in claiming that: "Because the case was
dismissed without an answer having been filed to the complaint, it is unknown whether any
program in which Baker may be a potential participant receives Federal financial assistance.
He may have a justiciable claim if there is such a program." Id.
96. Comment, Toward Equal Rights for Handicapped Individuals Judicial Enforcement of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 38 OHio ST. I.J. 677 (1977).
97. Id. at 677. See, e.g., Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982) (relat-
ing to gender); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000c-l, 2000e-17 (1982) (relat-
ing to race, color and national origin).
98. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) provides that: "No person
in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
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federal financial assistance did not constitute a program or activity cov-
ered by Title VI, and that, therefore, under Title VI black prisoners
could be discriminated against with respect to general prison conditions
on the basis of race?
While there is a dearth of judicial precedent on this issue (other than
the previously quoted statement from Kendrick), the ruling of Brauner
contravenes the prevailing administrative interpretation of section 504,
and is a voice in the wilderness. The congressional committee reports
discussing section 504 state that "[s]ection 504 was enacted to prevent
discrimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their
need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation services, in
relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing, transportation,
education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs." '99
That the term "any other Federally aided program" was intended to en-
compass prisons maintained by departments of correction receiving fed-
eral financial assistance was expressly recognized by the Department of
Justice when it promulgated regulations implementing section 504 in
1981. The initial regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice
contained an appendix analyzing the final rules that discussed, inter alia,
"[p]hysical and [o]ther [a]ccessibility to [programs."1° Specific "Deten-
tion and Correctional Agencies and Facilities"101 were among the "pro-
grams" whose responsibilities were discussed in that appendix. The
section 504 responsibilities of correctional agencies and facilities were
stated as applying to "jails, prisons, reformatories and training schools,
work camps, reception and diagnostic centers, pre-release and work re-
lease facilities, and community-based facilities." 102
According to the Department of Justice, the section 504 responsibil-
ities of such jails, prisons, and other correctional facilities receiving fed-
eral financial assistance included: the provision of "structural
modifications to accommodate detainees or prisoners in wheelchairs" in
certain designated circumstances; the provision of accessible visitation
areas; and the insurance of ready physical accessibility to "[flacilities...
such as classrooms, infirmary, laundry, dining areas, recreation areas,
work areas and chapels ..... 103 The Department of Justice noted that,
99. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516 (1974), U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6373, 6388 (emphasis added).
100. 28 C.F.R. Part 42, Appendix B - Analysis of Final Rule, Subpart G (1980). See Non-
discrimination Programs, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,627, 37,629 (1980) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. Part 42) (emphasis added).'
101. Id. at subpart C(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 37,630 (1980).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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under section 504, "[c]orrectional officials should take into account any
handicaps which inmates may have in classifying them. In making hous-
ing and program assignments, such officials must be mindful of the vul-
nerability of some handicapped inmates to physical and other abuse by
other inmates."' Although the entire appendix B (which included an
extensive section discussing the responsibilities of employers) was subse-
quently eliminated from the Department of Justice regulations,10 the de-
letion was made for administrative purposes only, and the principles
elucidated therein still reflect the Department of Justice's position.
10 6
Further, much of the federal financial assistance provided to state
and local governments is given under the Revenue Sharing Act. 107
Under that Act, state and local governments are allocated specified "enti-
tlement funds" from the federal treasury. 08 Section 6716 of the Revenue
Sharing Act provides that when "a state government or unit of general
local government.., receives a payment under [the Act]," the "prohibi-
tion against discrimination against an otherwise qualified handicapped
104. Id. The Department of Justice further stated that "[t]he existence of a handicap alone
should not, however, be the basis for segregation of such inmates in institutions or any part
thereof where other arrangements can be made to satisfy safety, security and other needs of the
handicapped inmate." Id.
105. See 46 Fed. Reg. 52,339, 52,357 (1980) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Ch. 1) ("Appendix
B, Analysis of Final Rule, Part 42 is removed").
106. The Federal Register states that: "Parts 0 through 60, Title 28 of the Code of Federal
Regulations [were amended for the purpose of] reflect[ing] a reorganization of the Department
of Justice." Id. at 52,339. In a telephone conversation of November 20, 1987, John Wodatch,
Deputy of the Coordinating and Review Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Depart-
ment of Justice, relayed the following information to this author: Appendix B was deleted
from the regulations in part due to the expense of publishing such a lengthy appendix to the
rules in the Code of Federal Regulations. While the Appendix was considered appropriate for
the purposes of the initial regulations, which were intended to establish an historical and regu-
latory framework for section 504, it was not deemed necessary to continue to incur the expen-
diture of publishing that appendix in later codified versions of the regulations. The
Department of Justice felt that it was sufficient that the appendix remained available in the
Federal Register, and could be viewed therein and cited from that source. According to Mr.
Wodatch, the appendix remains viable authority, and when making the decision not to publish
the appendix in the Code of Federal Regulations the Department of Justice "had no intent to
back away from any position taken" therein. Mr. Wodatch further stated that the Department
of Justice intends that the appendix will continue to be relied on as authority for the position
taken by the Department.
107. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6724 (repealed 1986).
108. "Entitlement Funds" means the amount of revenue sharing payments to which a unit
of local government is entitled as determined by the Director [of the Office of Revenue Shar-
ing] pursuant to the allocation formula contained in the Act and as established by regulations
under this part, including the interest earned on entitlement funds deposited in financial insti-
tutions prior to their use, obligation or appropriation." Money and Finance Treasury, 31
C.F.R. & 51.2(f) (1987).
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individual under section 504" is specifically applicable. °9
The Department of the Treasury has enacted regulations with re-
spect to the section 504 obligations of the Office of Revenue Sharing
(O.R.S.) that are similar to the Department of Justice regulations. 10
Further, in its "General Information" section of the O.R.S. regulations,
when defining the "program[s] or activit[ies]" that are to receive federal
financial assistance in the form of entitlement funds, the United States
Department of the Treasury has included operations (i.e., prisons) of a
corrections department. The Treasury Department regulations provide:
"Program or activity" means the operations of the agency or
organizational unit of a recipient government or the operations
or organizational unit of a secondary recipient funded with en-
titlement funds (examples include, but are not limited to a po-
lice department, department of corrections, health department,
or a division of a public or private corporation)."'1
In short, the Department of Justice, the Treasury Department and
at least one court have recognized that a prison facility operated by a
state or local department of corrections constitutes a program or activity
within the meaning of section 504. Clearly section 504 governs with re-
spect to all aspects of prison life, and prisons that are recipients of federal
financial assistance may not discriminate with respect to conditions of
confinement on the basis of handicap.
D. Discrimination Under Section 504
A recent Supreme Court decision, Alexander v. Choate,12 sheds
light on the nature of the discrimination prohibited by section 504. In
that case, Medicaid recipients in Tennessee brought a class action claim-
ing that a change in Medicaid policy, which reduced from twenty to
fourteen the number of in-patient hospital days per fiscal year Tennessee
Medicaid would pay hospitals on behalf of a Medicaid recipient, violated
section 504. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that, because handi-
capped people generally require more hospitalization than nonhandicap-
ped people, the regulation had an impermissible disparate impact on the
handicapped. It rejected the claim on the ground that handicapped per-
sons had meaningful and equal access to the benefit of obtaining fourteen
days of hospital coverage.11 3
109. 31 U.S.C. § 6716(2) (repealed 1986).
110. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 51.50-51.55 (1987).
111. 31 C.F.R. § 51.20) (1987).
112. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
113. Id. at 302.
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Nevertheless, the Alexander court recognized that discrimination
against handicapped persons is usually the result of benign indifferences
or paternalistic attitudes, rather than a result of a hostile animus. There-
fore, the Court noted, "much of the conduct that Congress sought to
alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible
to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a
discriminatory intent." '114 The Supreme Court held that it is not neces-
sary to find discriminatory intent before a cause of action may lie under
section 504;"1 rather, actions that are not intentional, but that have a
disparate impact on handicapped people, may be impermissibly discrimi-
natory under that Act. However, the Court failed to find such a dispa-
rate impact under the facts existing in Alexander.
The Alexander court also recognized that "[b]ecause the handi-
capped typically are not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped,"' 6 all
actions taken by recipients of federal financial assistance that have a dis-
parate impact on handicapped persons are not necessarily discriminatory
in violation of section 504. Rather, the Court held that to balance the
countervailing considerations of giving effect to the statutory objectives
of section 504 while at the same time keeping the Act within manageable
bounds, section 504 should be interpreted as requiring an otherwise qual-
ified handicapped individual to be provided with "meaningful access to
the benefit that the grantee offers."'1 7 The Court noted, however, that
the benefit itself, "cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to
which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accom-
modations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made."
' " 8
The factual situation involving deaf prison inmates is quite different
from the factual situation at issue in Alexander. In Alexander, the Court
found that by providing handicapped people with fourteen days of Medi-
caid-funded hospitalization the state would provide handicapped people
with meaningful access to hospital care. In contrast, as our hypothetical
case involving John and Fred graphically illustrates, absent the provision
of reasonable accommodations, deaf prison inmates are not, under any
definition of the term "meaningful," able to obtain meaningful access to
the general prison program or any of its specific components. Accord-
ingly, the failure to provide deaf prison inmates reasonable accommoda-
114. Id. at 296-97.
115. Id. at 298-99.
116. Id. at 298.
117. Id. at 301.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
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tions to allow participation in programs for which they are qualified
should be construed to be impermissibly discriminatory and violative of
section 504.
E. Reasonable Accommodations
There appears to be a general fear or reluctance on the part of pris-
oners or their attorneys to assert the section 504 rights of handicapped
prisoners. This reluctance may reflect, in part, an acknowledgement of
the general sentiment that handicapped prisoners do "not deserve any
special treatment to alleviate their unique forms of suffering because if
they had not committed a crime, they would not be suffering in jail."' 9
It may also reflect an acknowledgement of the reluctance of courts to
invoke section 504 on behalf of handicapped prisoners, a reluctance
clearly evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of Brauner v. McCon-
nell and the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the matter.120
Even where deaf prisoners are aware of their rights under section
504 and are willing to pursue those rights against prison officials, how-
ever, the rights of deaf prisoners under section 504 may be seriously lim-
ited by the "reasonable accommodation" standard. With respect to the
latter requirement, under section 504 program administrators are not re-
quired to make substantial modifications or fundamental alterations in
the nature of a program; rather, program administrators must merely
make reasonable accommodations for the handicaps of program partici-
pants.121 The concept of reasonableness cannot be considered in a vac-
uum, but must, of necessity, encompass the concept of cost;
accommodations that are excessively costly would exceed the bounds of
reasonableness.1 22 For example, while it would be excessively costly, and
thus unreasonable, to require the provision of a full time interpreter for a
deaf prison inmate, it would certainly be reasonable to require that a
qualified interpreter be provided to interpret for a deaf prisoner during a
prison disciplinary hearing. Similarly, while it would be excessively
costly, and thus unreasonable, to require that all deaf prison inmates be
housed in a special prison facility manned by guards who utilize sign
119. Baum, Handicapped Prisoners: An Ignored Minority?, 18 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS.
349, 352 n.16 (1983). Presumably, under this rationale it must be assumed that deaf pre-trial
detainees also did something wrong, else they would not be in prison awaiting trial.
120. See supra note 77.
121. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 397, 407-12 (1979).
122. Cf. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303-08 (noting that excessive costs of ex-
panding Medicaid services for handicapped people, in light of the fact that handicapped per-
sons would receive meaningful access to Medicaid absent the expansion, served as an indicator
that Medicaid's actions were not violative of section 504).
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language, it would be considerably less costly, and presumably reason-
able, to require that a qualified interpreter be provided, upon reasonable
notification, to a deaf prisoner who wishes to attend a class, lecture,
church service or counseling program within the prison.
Given the historical reluctance of courts to broadly define the rights
of prisoners in general, 123 courts may attempt to narrowly define the
"reasonable accommodations" that must be made to fulfill the needs of
handicapped prisoners. Thus, it is not surprising that in Journey v. Vitek
the Eighth Circuit refused to hold erroneous the district court's factual
finding that the Nebraska Department of Corrections had not discrimi-
nated against a paraplegic prisoner, notwithstanding the circuit court's
acknowledgement that the prisoner's access to some prison activities was
limited since the prison did not have ramps allowing the prisoner to ob-
tain access to the second floor of the prison. 24 The Eighth Circuit's af-
firmance of the district court's finding implies that, by providing
handicapped prisoners with only limited access to prison activities, a de-
partment of corrections would satisfy the "reasonable accommodation"
standard under section 504. That reasoning is questionable. To fulfill
the letter and spirit of section 504, courts should interpret the "reason-
able accommodation" test fairly, rather than in an overly restrictive and
unduly narrow manner.
IV. CONSTITUIONAL RIGHTS
Inequities suffered by deaf prison inmates should be held to violate
the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment 125 and the fourteenth amendment's proscription against the denial
of equal protection of the law.126 Under current case law, however, the
123. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) ("restrictive and even harsh
[prison conditions] are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society" and are thus not unconstitutional); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1042 (1983) ("the Constitutional mandate against cruel and unusual punishment is not a war-
ranty of pleasant prison conditions"); Wolfish v. Levy, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) ("tt]he Constitution does not
require that sentenced prisoners be provided with every amenity which one might find
desirable").
124. Journey, 685 F.2d 239, 241-42 (8th Cir. 1982).
125. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
126. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. In many cases deaf prisoners would also have a substantive due process
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constitutional claims of deaf prison inmates would probably not pass
muster, for two reasons. First, current case law focuses on traditional
principles of anti-discrimination and equal protection which, as previ-
ously explained,1 27 do not lend themselves well to cases involving dis-
crimination against handicapped persons. Second, the courts have not
yet embraced the concept of interpreting the Constitution in light of the
evolving trend of recognizing the rights of handicapped people (in the
same manner that courts finally began interpreting the Constitution in
light of the trend of recognizing the rights of members of racial minori-
ties).1 28 The time has come, however, for deaf prison inmates to assert
their right to be treated as equals under the Constitution-as human be-
ings of equal dignity and worth-and to demand that society, and the
courts, recognize that right.
A. Equal Protection
Following traditional principles of equal protection analysis, the
Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination.1 29 Under
traditional equal protection analysis, therefore, prison officials could cir-
cumvent an equal protection claim asserted by deaf inmates by taking the
position that the inequitable conditions of confinement imposed upon
deaf prisoners are not a result of intentional discrimination but are
claim under the fourteenth amendment. In one case, Pyles v. Kamka, 491 F. Supp. 204 (D.
Md. 1980), a deaf prisoner complained that prison officials failed to provide him with inter-
preter services during prison disciplinary and other proceedings, in violation of his constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 206. In recognition of the deaf prisoner's rights (including, apparently, the
prisoner's eighth amendment rights), the defendants entered into a court-approved settlement
of the case which required prison officials to provide the deaf inmate with interpreter services
during parole and disciplinary hearings, and during certain prison activities, such as psycho-
logical counseling, medical care and on the job training, vocational or educational programs.
Id. at 205-06. While the fourteenth amendment analysis herein focuses on the equal protection
clause, the general principles discussed would apply in an analogous manner to an analysis
under the substantive due process clause.
127. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
128. In 1954, in the landmark ruling of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
the United States Supreme Court first gave official recognition to the rights of racial minorities
when it held that "separate but equal" educational institutions for black and white children
were unconstitutional. In the years following Brown, the Supreme Court gave recognition to
the constitutional protections of members of racial minorities in other areas. See, e.g., Mayor
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (segregated beaches unconstitutional); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregated buses unconstitutional); New Orleans City Park
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (segregated parks unconstitutional); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting marriages
between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications).
129. See, eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
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merely the incidental result of rules promulgated in furtherance of the
general management of prisons and prison inmates. As we have seen,
however, 130 discrimination on the basis of handicap is rarely the result of
intentional discrimination. One author has stated the problem concisely:
[The] usual assumptions about intent do not work in the case of
the handicapped. Discrimination law . . . generally assumes
that overt classifications reflect invidious distinctions and that
policies that affect protected classes disproportionately often re-
flect underlying discriminatory motives. Thus traditional dis-
crimination theory, as applied in the racial context, has come to
associate differential treatment, and sometimes differential im-
pact, with malevolent intent. Those harmed by racial discrimi-
nation are its "victims"; those who engage in it are the
"perpetrators." This division of the world makes it easy to dis-
tinguish cases: those in which the defendants intended to harm
the plaintiffs are actionable; those in which the defendant
meant no harm are usually not.
The application of these assumptions to the case of the
handicapped, however, is extraordinarily strained .... 131
Because traditional assumptions about intentional discrimination
are inapplicable to cases involving the handicapped, when analyzing the
equal protection claims of handicapped persons the traditional "intent"
requirement should be modified. Rather than phrasing the issue in terms
of whether the unequal treatment itself resulted from an intent to dis-
criminate and was thus impermissible under the appropriate standard of
review, the issue should be phrased in terms of whether the refusal to
take reasonable steps to remedy the unequal treatment constitutes imper-
missible discrimination. More specifically, the question should be
whether, after notification of the inequitable conditions of confinement
suffered by deaf prison inmates, the intentional refusal to make reason-
able accommodations to equalize the conditions of deaf and hearing pris-
oners violates the equal protection clause. It is only by stating the
question in this fashion that the equal protection clause can be meaning-
fully applied to handicapped persons.
Once the traditional intent requirement is appropriately modified,
however, the question becomes whether the refusal to make reasonable
accommodations to equalize the conditions of confinement for deaf pris-
130. See supra notes 55-63 and 114-115 and accompanying text.
131. PARMET, supra note 55, at 64 (footnote omitted).
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oners violates the equal protection clause. The first step in answering
this question is to determine the appropriate standard of review under
which to evaluate that refusal.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,132 the Supreme Court
held that mentally retarded people do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class for the purpose of equal protection analysis, and thus the
equal protection claims of mentally retarded people must be analyzed
under the rational basis test. The ruling of Cleburne has been widely
criticized as factually and legally unsound, 133 and this author agrees with
those criticisms. Unfortunately, however, that ruling will presumably be
held to apply to physically, as well as mentally, handicapped individu-
als,13 ' and thus for purposes of this article the author will assume that
the equal protection claims of deaf inmates will be analyzed under the
rational basis test enunciated in Cleburne. The relevant question is,
therefore, whether the unequal conditions of imprisonment suffered by
deaf prison inmates would be held irrational under the standards enunci-
ated in Cleburne.
1 35
132. 473 U.S. 456 (1985).
133. See, e.g., Comment, The Supreme Court -Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. RV. 120, 167-
69 (1985). The author noted: 1) the Court's unprecedented rejection of the immutability of a
group's defining characteristic as one indicator of suspectness; 2) the Court's unexplained deci-
sion "not to examine whether the retarded are a 'discrete and insular' minority"; and 3) the
Court's unprecedented reliance on the fact that remedial legislation had been passed when
answering the question of whether the retarded were politically powerless or subject to signifi-
cant prejudice. The author also vehemently objects to the Court's failure to inquire fully into
the historical questions of prejudice and fear shown the retarded when denying quasi-suspect
classification in part for the reason that retardation is often relevant to the achievement of
legitimate state ends. See also, Comment, Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded: A
Denial of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IOWA L.
Rtv. 241, 251 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Equal Protection] (objecting to the Court's im-
proper "conclusion that prejudice toward the mentally retarded no longer exists in light of the
legislative responses to their difficulties"); Comment, A Changing Equal Protection Standard?
The Supreme Court's Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 20 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 921, 948-56 (1987) [hereinafter Comment,
Changing Standard].
134. See, e.g., Baker v. Dep't of Environmental Conservation of the State of New York, 634
F. Supp. 1460, 1467-68 (N.D. N.Y. 1986) (following Cleburne in holding that physically dis-
abled people, like mentally disabled people, do not constitute a quasi-suspect class).
135. Correctional officials may argue that because all inmates, whether deaf or hearing, are
affirmatively treated the same, deaf inmates have no claim that they are subject to unequal
treatment. This superficial argument ignores the fact that the failure to provide accommoda-
tions for the unequal results that flow from technically equal treatment may also violate the
equal protection clause. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), non-English speaking stu-
dents alleged that the failure of a state school system to provide them with English language
instruction violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The students
argued that even though they were given the same course of instruction as all other school
children they were denied education on equal terms with English speaking students because
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Courts accord prison officials wide latitude in the administration of
prison affairs, and are reluctant to interfere in such matters.136 Thus,
courts rarely uphold the equal protection claims asserted by prison in-
mates, and usually defer to the rationales set forth by prison administra-
tors when holding that the unequal treatment at issue bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. Generally, unequal treatment
among prisoners is premised on the purported need to ensure prison se-
curity or safety, to prevent further crimes, 13 7 and to impose greater pun-
ishment where appropriate. 138  However, denying deaf inmates the
assistance of interpreters and other requisite accommodations for their
deafness is not usually (if ever) premised on the need to ensure prison
security or safety, to prevent further crimes, or to impose greater punish-
ment that is warranted by the greater culpability of the detainee or of-
fender. Thus, the usual "rational" reasons for condoning unequal
treatment among prisoners are inapplicable where deaf prisoners are at
issue.
The only state interest at issue with respect to the unequal treatment
of deaf prison inmates is, in most cases, that of avoiding the expense and
any related administrative inconvenience that would be incurred as a re-
they could not understand the language in which instruction was given. The Lau Court did
not decide whether the equal protection clause had been violated, because it held that the
school district's failure to provide English instruction violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court stated, however, that "equality of treatment" was not provided when non-English
speaking students were furnished with identical facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum
as English speaking students. Id. at 566. Just as equality of treatment is not provided by
educating non-English speaking students in the same manner as English speaking students,
equality of treatment is not provided by confining deaf inmates in the same manner as hearing
inmates. In both cases the failure to provide assistance to render conditions equal in any
meaningful fashion results in unequal treatment. Whether such unequal treatment violates
the equal protection clause, however, must be determined by application of the appropriate
constitutional test. The Lau Court did not reach that question.
136. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the decisions of prison authorities
should be given great weight. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 ("[c]ourts must
bear in mind that their inquiies [relating to conditions of confinement] spring from constitu-
tional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
539(1979)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("[p]rison administrators ... should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institu-
tional security.").
137. E.g., Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343-44 (8th Cir. 1985) (discretionary parole statute
applied more harshly to sex offenders did not violate the equal protection clause because the
goal of preventing sex crimes through rehabilitation and deterrence constituted a rational basis
for the distinction).
138. E.g., United States v. Garret, 680 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1982) (disparity between
sentences given to several codefendants did not violate the equal protection clause, because
some codefendants were more culpable than others and thus deserving of greater punishment).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
suit of the provision of reasonable accommodations. In some instances,
however, costs alone have been held to constitute a sufficiently legitimate
state interest so as to warrant the imposition of unequal treatment. The
Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n the area of economic and social wel-
fare, a state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because
the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." '39 Thus, where states
have determined that the expense of "equalizing" conditions between
two sets of citizens is too high, some courts have recognized that such
cost considerations constitute a rational basis for the unequal treatment.
For example, in Selph v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 14 the court held
that, where the cost of modifying all of a city's polling places to eliminate
architectural barriers to handicapped people would require "an unfair
expenditure of huge amounts of money in order to benefit a small seg-
ment of the total population," the equal protection clause was not vio-
lated even though some of the city's polling places were inaccessible to
handicapped voters. In Hammond v. Marx,4 ' the court held that where
the administration of school readiness tests to all preschool children
would be an unjustifiable expense in light of the high cost and questiona-
ble reliability of the tests, the failure to test children under six for readi-
ness for school did not violate the equal protection clause. 142 The
question is whether the costs of providing reasonable accommodations
for the needs of deaf prisoners would be held, under Cleburne, to consti-
tute a rational basis for the failure to provide such accommodations.
Although declining to label mentally retarded people a quasi-suspect
class, the Court in Cleburne refused to allow application of a City of
Cleburne zoning ordinance that required the operators of a group home
for mentally retarded persons to obtain a special use permit. While
claiming to apply the rational basis test, the Court held that there was no
rational basis for the ordinance as applied to the proposed group home
for the mentally retarded. As noted by Justice Marshall, concurring in
part and dissenting in part to the majority's opinion in Cleburne, "[t]he
Court [held] the ordinance invalid on rational basis grounds and dis-
claim[ed] that anything special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, [was]
taking place. Yet Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid under the
traditional rational basis test applicable to economic and commercial
139. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
140. 390 F. Supp. 58 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
141. 406 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Me. 1975).
142. See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937)
("[a]dministrative convenience and expense in the collection or measurement of the tax are
alone a sufficient justification for the difference between the treatment of small incomes or
small tax payers and that meted out to others.").
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regulation .. ."143
In accord with Justice Marshall, commentators have uniformly rec-
ognized that the Court's review in Cleburne more closely resembles the
heightened review provided in cases involving quasi-suspect classes than
the traditional rational basis review. 144
Similarly, in other recent cases the Court has gone beyond "tradi-
tional" rational basis review to more closely scrutinize regulatory legisla-
tion. Thus, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 145 the Court applied
the "rational basis" test in holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute
that gave preferential tax treatment in the form of lower gross premium
tax rates only to domestic insurers. The Court held that the State's pur-
poses of encouraging the formation of new Alabama insurance compa-
nies and investment of capital by foreign insurance companies in
Alabama assets and securities were not sufficiently "rational" to with-
stand challenge under the equal protection clause in light of the discrimi-
natory effect that would result. In Williams v. Vermont,146 the Court
struck down a statute that gave preferential vehicle tax treatment to Ver-
mont residents who were residents at the time of certain vehicle
purchases. Despite the statute's presumably rational purposes of protect-
143. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part;
joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J.).
144. One commentator has stated that the Court's unusual action in holding the ordinance
at issue in Cleburne rational as applied "made the Court's minimum scrutiny take on the
characteristics of intermediate review" generally followed in cases involving members of quasi-
suspect classes. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 162
(1985). As that author noted, "what the Court in fact did by adopting an as-applied approach
was to create an intrusive, case-by-case mode of reviewing legislative classifications under min-
imum scrutiny." Id. at 171. The author further recognized that "because of the Court's insis-
tence that it was applying the same level of review it normally accords social and economic
legislation, Cleburne stands as a precedent for the application of a form of heightened scrutiny
to all legislative classifications." Id. at 167. See also Comment, Equal Protection, supra note
133, at 253 ("[a]lthough the Court purported to apply the rational basis test, its scrutiny more
closely resembled a heightened review"); Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional
Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739, 784 (Nov. 1986) ("[t]he Court's decision in
Cleburne does not persuasively rely upon application of the traditional rational basis test ....
The fact that the city [of Cleburne] had chosen to address problems of overcrowding, flooding
and fire hazards in homes for the mentally retarded but not in fraternities or apartment houses
... would not have offended traditional rational basis review."); Cf., Comment, Justice Stevens'
Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1150 (1987) ("[tihe Court's equal
protection opinions of the last decade evidence more frequent use of heightened scrutiny in
cases in which the Court purports to apply only minimum 'rational basis' review"); Comment,
Changing Standard, supra note 133, at 957 (the rational basis test applied in Cleburne "is more
a 'rational justification' test that falls somewhere between the minimal rational basis test and
the intermediate scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications").
145. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
146. 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
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ing the state against lost revenues from out-of-state automobile purchas-
ers and requiring those who use Vermont's highways to contribute to
their maintenance and improvement, the Court held that offering tax
benefits to "old" as opposed to "new" Vermont residents was arbitrary
and irrational. Similarly, in Hooper v. Bernalillo,147 the Court held un-
constitutional New Mexico's lifetime property tax exemption for Viet-
nam veterans who established residency before May 8, 1976. The Court
rejected the state's argument that the statute was rationally related to the
legitimate goal of showing appreciation to citizens who served in the mil-
itary, holding that, in distinguishing between veterans who became resi-
dents before a certain date and those who became residents later, the law
impermissibly "create[d] 'fixed, permanent distinctions between . . .
classes of concededly bona fide residents,'" based on how long they have
been in the state. 148
In all of these cases, rather than applying traditional rational basis
review-under which the state is presumed to have acted within its con-
stitutional powers and the equal protection clause is held violated only if
"the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective" 149-the Court balanced the legitimacy of the
stated purpose(s) for the classification versus the severity of the discrimi-
natory effect resulting therefrom. Thus, the Court struck down the stat-
utes at issue in Williams and Hooper because they had the effect of
discriminating unfairly against newer state residents; it struck down the
statute at issue in Metropolitan Life because it discriminated heavily
against foreign industry; it struck down the zoning regulation at issue in
Cleburne as applied because it discriminated heavily against a group of
mentally disabled persons. 150
Lower courts have begun following the Supreme Court's lead in re-
jecting "traditional" rational basis analysis. When applying the rational
basis test, these courts have begun to balance the legitimacy of the state's
articulated purposes for the discriminatory action versus the severity of
the discriminatory effect resulting from that action. For example, the
court in Coburn v. Agustin examined a Kansas statute, which provided
that damages recoverable by a plaintiff for personal injuries could be re-
147. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
148. Id. at 617. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982), in which the Court struck down under the rational basis test Alaska's dividend distri-
bution plan which favored established residents over new residents.
149. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
150. For an excellent analysis of the Court's "heightened review" in these four cases see
Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53
U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1455 (1986).
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duced by the amount of payment or services received from sources other
than the tortfeasor, under the rational basis test. 151 That court held that
it "must balance the societal interests against the class interests served by
the legislation and measure the benefits and burdens of the law." The
court weighed the state's goal of lowering medical malpractice insurance
against the interests of the victims of medical malpractice, and found the
law unconstitutional. While declining to apply an intermediate standard
of review, the court held that since "the statute significantly impinges
upon the important rights of a class without the resources or capacity to
protect itself," it was applying "a heightened form of rational basis scru-
tiny." '152 The court noted that in Cleburne and Metropolitan Life, the
Supreme Court "altered" or "modified" the rational basis test, and con-
cluded that "[i]n tandem, [those cases] convincingly demonstrate the
Supreme Court's implementation of a more exacting rational basis
test." 153 The court stated:
The rational basis test is now being applied in a manner that is
not outcome-determinative. Apparently, the Supreme Court is
recognizing that not all cases involving economic and social
welfare legislation can be made to fit into the traditional ra-
tional basis test and still comport with fundamental fairness
under the equal protection clause.
1 54
Similarly, in Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo,"5 the Court held
invalid under the rational basis test New York's Used and Useful Act,
under which a nuclear power plant's costs would be excluded from the
power company's rate base if the plant was not in operation by a specified
date. The court also noted that in Cleburne, Hooper and Williams the
Court applied a" 'means-oriented' model for judicial scrutiny" under the
rational basis test.1 56 Moreover, in Cleburne and Hooper "the [Supreme]
Court, while conceding the legitimacy of most of the purposes the state
claimed were furthered by the challenged ordinance, demanded some
plausible connection between those ends and the burdens placed on those
who were singled out by the ordinance." 157 Finally, in Deibler v. City of
151. 627 F. Supp. 983, 996 (D. Kan. 1985).
152. Id. at 997; accord Fretz v. Keltner, 109 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Kan. 1986). Contra,
Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335, 339 (D. Kan. 1986) (refusing to apply the test applied
in Coburn v. Augustin and Fretz v. Keltner).
153. Coburn, 627 F. Supp. at 989.
154. Id. at 990. The court recognized, however, that "it is true that the Supreme Court has
not officially articulated a new test," and that "it is unclear whether the old rational basis test
has been supplemented or supplanted ...." Id.
155. 666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
156. Id. at 419-420.
157. Id. at 420.
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Rehoboth Beach,15 the court struck down as unconstitutional under the
rational basis test a requirement that candidates for members of the city
commission must be current in their city tax payments. The Deibler
court noted that the rational basis test, while once "direct and objective,"
has, under Cleburne and Hooper, "become perhaps the most sophisti-
cated and subjective of judicial tests" which "calls upon a judge's per-
sonal understanding of the needs of society." '59
Under this newly applied (if not directly articulated by the Supreme
Court) "heightened rationality test," courts should balance the benefits
and burdens resulting from the refusal to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for the needs of deaf prisoners, a class of persons clearly without the
resources or capacity to protect itself. Courts should further demand
some rationale beyond mere cost savings to explain the connection be-
tween the refusal to accommodate and the placement of extreme burdens
on deaf prisoners as a result of that refusal. The Court's unusual action
in Cleburne in finding a municipality's economic and commercial zoning
ordinance unconstitutional as applied to handicapped persons-under
the rational basis test-is indicative of: (1) the Court's awareness of the
growing public outrage against the unjust treatment traditionally meted
out to the handicapped; and (2) the Court's initial receptiveness to the
concept that handicapped people are entitled to enjoy the full panoply of
Constitutional rights.
Similarly, courts should recognize that the "needs of society" now
include the needs of handicapped people. Our society has come to recog-
nize that it is morally and ethically abhorrent to treat our handicapped
members as second class citizens. 6 It is time for the courts to interpret
the Constitution in accord with the groundswell of public opinion that
158. 790 F.2d 328 (3rd Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 334 n.l.
160. The handicapped rights movement began in the 1970s, when handicapped people be-
gan demanding civil rights protections similar to those established for racial minorities and
women. Partly in response to that advocacy movement, and partly in response to some cases
decided on constitutional principles (eg., Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F.
Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)), in the 1970s Congress enacted a series of laws aimed at protecting
handicapped people from discrimination and integrating handicapped people into the main-
stream of American life. The most prominent laws enacted were Sections 501 through 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-796 (1973), and the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1975). Although these laws were passed in the
early 1970s, it was not until the late 1970s, in response to further outcry from handicapped
people, that any real attempts were made to implement or enforce the laws. Since then, public
outcry about the plight of our handicapped citizens has been widespread. Society has come to
recognize the right of handicapped people to receive equal treatment and opportunities, and
the courts have begun to enforce these laws in earnest.
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demands equal rights for handicapped people, and to interpret the equal
protection clause in a manner that gives fair recognition to the rights of
our handicapped citizens.
Under the heightened rationality test applied in Cleburne, the cost
saving rationale followed in Selph and Hammond should not be held to
apply to the refusal to make reasonable accommodations for deaf prison-
ers. Rather, when balancing the legitimacy of a state's stated purpose of
saving money versus the gross severity of the discriminatory effect upon a
powerless class resulting therefrom, the equal protection clause should be
interpreted as requiring that reasonable accommodations be made to as-
sist in equalizing conditions of confinement between deaf and hearing
prisoners. Where reasonable alternatives are feasible, under the more
stringent rational basis test recently applied by the Supreme Court it
should be held irrational for prison officials to refuse to implement such
alternatives.
161
B. The Eighth Amendment
Prior to discussing the rights of deaf prison inmates under the eighth
amendment, it should be noted that the constitutional rights of deaf pre-
trial detainees are somewhat different from the constitutional rights of
convicted deaf offenders. While the eighth amendment's prohibition
161. It is arguable that certain of the accommodations required by deaf prisoners, such as
the provision of decoders to enable deaf prisoners to watch television, fall outside the protec-
tion of the equal protection clause, because the specific conditions at issue (i.e., the inability to
watch television) are not of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection. This
argument, of course, would not apply with respect to the bulk of the accommodations required
by deaf prisoners, such as the need for qualified interpreters to interpret during prison proceed-
ings and functions, the provision of TDD's to allow deaf prisoners to utilize the telephone, and
the modification of employment tests to allow deaf persons to obtain employment within the
prison for which they are otherwise qualified. But with respect to those few accommodations
that would, if viewed singularly, fall outside the scope of constitutional protections, it is sub-
mitted that the focus should be on the totality of conditions for deaf prisoners.
To the extent that the total conditions of confinement suffered by deaf prisoners violate
the equal protection clause, fine lines should not be drawn between the individual conditions at
issue so that some conditions may be remedied and others may not. The solution to the gener-
ally inequitable conditions suffered by deaf prisoners lies in providing reasonable accommoda-
tions with respect to the overall prison conditions. It may be unreasonable, and unduly costly
in some cases, to fully remedy a condition that is of sufficient importance to warrant constitu-
tional protection, while it may be reasonable to remedy a condition that, standing alone, does
not warrant constitutional protection. It would be unreasonable, for example, to provide a
deaf prisoner with a full time interpreter during his employment at prison, notwithstanding
that issues involving employment are worthy of constitutional protection. At the same time, it
would be reasonable to provide a relatively inexpensive television decoder for a deaf prisoner
(approximate cost $200) to ease the heavy burden of the prisoner's solitary confinement,
notwithstanding that the denial of the ability to watch television does not, per se, warrant
constitutional protection.
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against cruel and unusual punishment applies to convicted deaf offend-
ers, when evaluating the constituti6nality of conditions of confinement
pertaining to deaf pretrial detainees the "proper inquiry is whether those
conditions amount to punishment of the detainee" absent an adjudication
of guilt, in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 162
1. Rights of convicted deaf prisoners
Although the rights of handicapped prisoners under the eighth
amendment have been analyzed by several commentators, 163 those analy-
ses focus in general on the Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v. Gam-
ble. 1 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment
prohibits prison officials from manifesting a "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners .. ".."16' While the problems con-
fronting many handicapped prisoners may be medically related (even if
they do not concern medical necessities), the problems confronting deaf
prisoners are only rarely medically related. 66 Thus, Estelle is not di-
rectly applicable when determining the constitutional rights of deaf pris-
oners under the eighth amendment.
Nevertheless, Estelle is significant to this discussion. When prohib-
iting "deliberate indifference" to the serious medical needs of prisoners,
162. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). The Court cited Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 671-72, n.40 (1977), in stating:
Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with
the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions ....
[Tihe state does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment
is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law. Where the state seeks to impose punishment without such
an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at n.16 (citation omitted).
163. See, eg., Brenner, The Parameters of Cruelty: Application of Estelle v. Gamble to
Sentences Imposed upon the Physically Fragile Offender, 12 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 280 (1984);
Baum, supra note 119, at 359-79.
164. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
165. Id. at 104.
166. It has been noted that the ruling of Estelle v. Gamble applies only in cases involving
medical necessity, and that therefore Estelle might "not directly support a handicapped in-
mate's claim for special accommodations since the problems causing the inmate's suffering is
not a medical necessity." Baum, supra note 119, at 362. The claims of many physically handi-
capped inmates are often medically related, however, in that they pertain to the need for ac-
commodations relating to the performance of bodily functions, such as the use of toilets, sinks
and shower facilities, or the need for accommodations relating to physical care, such as assist-
ance to prevent the formation of bedsores. But the claims of deaf prisoners are only of a
medical nature insofar as they relate to the need for the provision of hearing aids or hearing aid
molds.
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the Court implied that only intentional conduct on the part of prison
officials will constitute a violation of the eighth amendment. The Court
stated that "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care can-
not be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or
to be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' "167 Rather, to state a
claim under the eighth amendment, "a prisoner must allege acts or omis-
sions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs."' 68
Once again, to comport with the relevant precepts of the law as ap-
plied to the handicapped, the courts must analyze the intent requirement
in terms of the deliberate refusal to make reasonable accommodations for
deaf prisoners rather than in terms of the deliberate imposition of un-
justly disproportionate prison conditions.'69 Indeed, that is exactly the
"intent" analysis required in Estelle. The "deliberate indifference to seri-
ous medical needs" test focuses on the deliberate failure to provide "ac-
commodations" (i.e., medical treatment) to alleviate problems caused by
medical concerns. In the same manner, the "deliberate indifference to
the needs of deaf prisoners" test would focus on the failure to provide
accommodations to alleviate problems caused by deafness.
When looking at the proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment in the context of the punishment suffered by deaf inmates, the first
substantive inquiry focuses on the equal protection aspects of the eighth
amendment. In Furman v. Georgia,170 the Supreme Court held that the
imposition of the death penalty violates the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment if the punishment discrimi-
nates against an offender "by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social
position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room
for the play of such prejudices."'' The Court noted that "the basic
theme of equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishments.
'A penalty.., should be considered "unusually" imposed if it is adminis-
tered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.' "172 Accordingly, the Court held
that laws which give a jury unfettered discretion to determine when to
apply the death penalty violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment.
In Furman, the Court was concerned with the severity of the "type"
167. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
168. Id. at 106.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 55-63 and 114-15.
170. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
171. Id. at 242.
172. Id. at 249 (quoting Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitu-
tional, 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 1773, 1790 (1970)) (footnotes omitted).
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of punishment imposed upon one offender (the death penalty), as op-
posed to the "type" of punishment imposed upon another offender (life
imprisonment). Because a deaf offender receives the same "type" of pun-
ishment as a hearing offender (i.e., imprisonment in both cases), and be-
cause this article is not concerned with the death penalty, as the Furman
court was, the cases are somewhat inapposite. Nevertheless, Furman is
significant to our discussion because of the Court's emphasis on the fact
that the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment encom-
passes "the idea of equal protection of the laws." '173 While every denial
of equal protection can hardly be said to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, the failure to make reasonable accommodations to alleviate
the cruel and unusual suffering incurred by deaf prisoners, which consti-
tutes a, denial of equal protection, should be held to violate the eighth
amendment.
Justice Marshall, concurring in the per curiam opinion in Furman,
specified "four distinct reasons" why a punishment may be deemed cruel
and unusual.174 Among the reasons cited by Justice Marshall for finding
a penalty cruel and unusual is "because it is excessive and serves no valid
legislative purpose." '175 As noted by Justice Marshall, "[t]he entire
thrust of the Eighth Amendment is ... against 'that which is exces-
sive,' "176 and thus "one of the primary functions of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause is to prevent excessive or unnecessary
penalties."' 177 This prohibition against excessive punishments has two as-
pects: "First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime." '178
The first prong of the test enunciated by Justice Marshall involves
the prohibition against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
The argument that the harsh prison conditions suffered by deaf prisoners
are the necessary consequence of their deafness and their justifiable
prison sentences ignores reality. Those disproportionate and discrimina-
173. Id.
174. Id. at 330-33 (Marshall, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring). The remaining reasons cited by Justice Marshall
for finding punishments cruel and unusual involve:
1) punishments that "inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized
people cannot tolerate them" (id. at 330) (Marshall, J., concurring); 2) punishments that are so
unusual as to be "previously unknown as [the penalty] for a given offence" (id. at 331) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring); and 3) punishments that are abhorred by popular sentiment (id. at 332)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring).
178. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citations omitted).
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torily harsh conditions can easily be alleviated in many instances by the
provision of qualified interpreters for deaf inmates in the conduct of
prison proceedings and rehabilitative programs, by the provision of
TDD's and decoders for deaf inmates, and by modifying some rules to
accommodate the needs of.deaf inmates. The only barrier to making
such purportedly "necessary" treatment "unnecessary" is one of cost; it
is axiomatic that "[h]umane considerations and constitutional require-
ments are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar
"1179considerations....
The second prong of the test enunciated by Justice Marshall in-
volves the requirement of proportionality. The prohibition against exces-
siveness focuses on the amount of pain and suffering that constitutionally
may be inflicted. Thus, in Solem v. Helm, 1 0 the Supreme Court focused
on proportionality when assessing the excessiveness of the punishment
imposed upon a convicted offender. In Solem, the defendant was con-
victed in South Dakota state court of uttering a "no account" check for
$100. Because the defendant had previously been convicted of six felo-
nies, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole
under South Dakota's recidivist statute. When determining whether So-
lem's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the Court
compared his sentence to sentences imposed on other offenders in South
Dakota for similar and dissimilar crimes. It also compared the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime committed by defendants in
other jurisdictions. The Court concluded that, because Solem was
"treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have com-
mitted more serious crimes" and because Solem was "treated more
179. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968)). Accord, Gates v.
Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732, 743 (N.D. Miss. 1976) ("constitutional treatment of human beings
confined to penal institutions is not dependent upon the willingness or the financial ability of
the State to provide decent penitentiaries"), aff'd, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v.
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[w]here state institutions have been operating
under unconstitutional conditions and practices, the defenses of fund shortage and the inability
of the district court to order appropriations by the state legislature, have been rejected by the
federal courts"); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1146 ("Constitutional rights are not, of
course, confined to those available at modest cost"), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). But cf. Stickney v. List, 519 F. Supp.
617, 619 (D. Nev. 1981) (any analysis of prison conditions in the context of the eighth amend-
ment "must consider the cost to determine if it would be unnecessarily expensive and whether
or not it would impair prison security."). Cost is relevant, however, when weighing one rem-
edy to right a constitutional violation versus another remedy. See, e.g., Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1146
("[y]et in considering remedies for unconstitutional deprivation, the cost of one proposed rem-
edy in comparison with the cost of others and the demonstrable need for the remedy should
both be considered").
180. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possi-
ble exception of a single state," Solem's sentence was disproportionate to
his crime and was thus prohibited by the eighth amendment."' 1
Applying the requisite proportionality analysis with respect to the
punishment inflicted upon deaf offenders requires a shift in points of
comparison. With respect to a deaf offender the appropriate question for
proportionality purposes is whether the harshness of the penalty imposed
upon the offender is seriously disproportionate to the penalty imposed
upon a hearing offender in the same jurisdiction for the same offense. As
our hypothetical case of John and Fred clearly illustrates,1 82 the punish-
ments inflicted upon deaf offenders are much more harsh than the pun-
ishments inflicted upon hearing offenders who commit the same crime in
the same jurisdiction. The fact that the terms of imprisonment received
by both offenders are of the same length should not be dispositive.
Rather, the dispositive fact should be that deaf offenders are treated
much more harshly than hearing offenders, in that the amount of pain
and suffering inflicted upon the former is far greater than the amount of
pain and suffering inflicted on the latter.
Alternatively, if we decline to compare the harshness of the penalty
imposed upon a deaf offendir (Fred) as compared to the penalty imposed
upon a hearing offender (John) who has committed a similar crime, we
reach the same result by comparing the severity of the deaf prisoner's
sentence to the crime committed by that prisoner. The virtual isolation
to which Fred is sentenced-the confinement for ten years without mean-
ingful access to the rehabilitative, educational or social aspects of prison
life and without any means of interacting with other human beings-
appears to be out of line with the gravity of his offense. The disparate
nature of the effective sentence to be served by John serves merely as an
indication of this dissonance. Focusing the proportionality argument on
either of these points of comparison should lead to the same result.
By way of analogy, picture the following scenario: Congress enacts
a law providing for the creation of a new federal prison that is to employ
experimental punitive measures for the purpose of determining whether
such measures serve as a significant deterrent to future criminal activity.
While most federal offenders are required to serve their sentences in
traditional (i.e., "normal") prisons, a small number of randomly selected
offenders are placed in the experimental prison. The experimental prison
contains no rehabilitative, social or church related programs; prisoners
181. Id. at 303.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 17-5 1.
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are not allowed to socialize with one another or to use the telephone; the
prison does not contain a television, radio or any other such electronic
device. The guards at the experimental prison communicate in a compli-
cated, unique "language," in which they have received extensive training,
that involves the use of squeaks pitched beyond the range of human hear-
ing. Prisoners who want to speak to the guards or to other prisoners for
necessary matters must also speak in that strange language. It would
certainly seem to be cruel and unusual to subject arbitrarily selected per-
sons to such conditions. But how do we articulate our reason for reach-
ing that decision? Is it because the conditions to which the randomly
selected prisoners are subjected are so disproportionate to the conditions
to which other prisoners are subjected that they stand out as glaringly
"cruel and unusual?" Or is it because the conditions to which the ran-
domly selected prisoners are subjected are inherently unfair and outra-
geous when compared to the crimes committed by the prisoners? In
effect these two rationales are really one and the same. That is, whether
phrased in terms of the disproportionality between penalties received by
two persons who have committed similar crimes or in terms of the dis-
proportionality between the crime and the penalty, the disproportionality
test is simply a gut-wrenching test for cruelty-a test that the disporpor-
tionate conditions of confinement served by deaf prisoners seems clearly
to satisfy.
Our final inquiry with respect to eighth amendment principles fo-
cuses on the concept of isolation or solitary confinement. A profoundly
deaf offender who communicates solely 'Via the use of sign language and
is serving a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution where in-
mates and staff all hear and do not know sign language, and where no
accommodations are made for the offender's deafness, is, for all practical
purposes, required to serve his time in virtual isolation. It is appropriate,
therefore, to examine the circumstances under which isolation or solitary
confinement have been deemed not violative of the eighth amendment.
Segregated administrative detention does not, per se, violate the
eighth amendment.183 Nevertheless, there are constitutional limitations
upon the extent to which prisoners may be isolated from humanity.
Thus, isolation in prison becomes cruel and unusual when "it offends 'the
183. See, eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) ("lilt is perfectly obvious that
every decision to remove a particular inmate from the general prison population for an indeter-
minate period could not be characterized as cruel and unusual"). Accord Graham v. Willing-
ham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 399 (8th Cir. 1975);
see also, Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51
A.L.R.3d 111, 164-69 (1973) and 1987 Supp. 78-83.
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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' ,184
While courts have frequently upheld the constitutionality of solitary
confinement imposed for disciplinary reasons, 185 even in that context the
Supreme Court has cautioned that "the length of confinement cannot be
ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional stan-
dards."' 86 Federal courts of appeals have frequently noted that the
length of time in isolation must be considered when reviewing the eighth
amendment claims of prisoners confined in segregation, because pro-
longed solitary confinement can lead to serious physical and mental
deterioration.'
8 7
Accordingly, even where solitary confinement is imposed as a "nec-
essary tool of prison discipline, both to punish infractions and to control
and perhaps protect inmates whose presence within the general popula-
tion would create unmanageable risks,"' 188 there are constitutional limita-
tions upon isolated prison confinement. Where, as in the case of deaf
inmates, there is no disciplinary basis for the enforced isolation, and the
isolation will continue for the entire length of the prisoners' sentence (in
Fred's case, for example, for ten years), such isolation should shock the
conscience and offend the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.' 89 Thus, prison officials should be consti-
tutionally required to "explore feasible altemative[s]"' 190 to the unneces-
sarily enforced isolation of deaf prisoners, by making reasonable
accommodations for their deafness.
In sum, the disproportionate and discriminatory punishments suf-
fered by deaf offenders should be held violative of the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It has long
been recognized that the eighth amendment is not static, and that in ac-
184. Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
185. See, e.g., Burmarner v. Bloodworth, 768 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1985); Jackson v.
Meachum, 699 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1983); Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1982);
LaPlante v. Southworth, 484 F. Supp. 115 (D.R.I. 1980); Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378 (10th
Cir. 1975); O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v.
Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1973).
186. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686 n.10.
187. See, eg., Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1429 (11th Cir. 1987); Meriwether v.
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 311 (1987); Jackson,
699 F.2d at 584-85; Pepperling, 678 F.2d at 789; Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir.
1980); Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir. 1975) (en
banc); O'Brien, 489 F.2d at 944.
188. O'Brien, 489 F.2d at 944.
189. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
190. Jackson, 699 F.2d at 585.
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cord with " 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society' "191 the words "cruel and unusual" must be inter-
preted "'in a flexible and dynamic manner.' "192 It has also long been
recognized that punishment must accord with the "'dignity of man,'
which is the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment." 193 Dur-
ing the last ten years our society has come to recognize the terrible plight
faced by many handicapped individuals and has taken giant steps in at-
tempting to remedy that plight by allowing our handicapped citizens to
enjoy the same opportunities to achieve the same quality of life as that
enjoyed by our non-handicapped citizens. 194 Our society's evolving stan-
dards of decency have come to include the recognition that handicapped
people must be treated with the dignity awarded non-handicapped peo-
ple. It is time for. deaf inmates to request that the courts interpret the
eighth amendment in light of this evolving standard of decency.195
2. Due process rights of pretrial detainees
"Any act or practice which violates the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment also violates the due process
rights of pretrial detainees under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 196 Thus, to the extent that denying deaf inmates the right to
interpreters, TDD's, decoders and other necessary assistance to accom-
modate for their deafness violates the eighth amendment rights of con-
191. E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
192. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)).
193. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
194. See supra text accompanying note 160.
195. To date, the author is unaware of any reported case in which it has been argued that
the harsher prison conditions imposed upon deaf inmates violates the eighth amendment. One
reason for this may be that traditional eighth amendment analysis frequently involves the ade-
quacy of prison shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, adequate clothing and medical care.
It has been held that " 'lan institution's obligation under the eighth amendment is at end if it
furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,
and personal safety."' Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Wolfish
v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978)); accord Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567-68 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th
Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
This statement, however, ignores the proportionality and equal protection components of the
eighth amendment, and addresses only one aspect of the ban against cruel and unusual
punishment.
196. Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 545 (1979)); cf Davis v. Smith, 638 F.2d 66, 68 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[t]he court's finding that
the conditions of Davis' pretrial detention constituted punishment under the eighth amend-
ment was clearly sufficient to establish a violation of Davis' due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment").
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victed deaf prisoners, such deprivation would also violate the due process
rights of deaf pretrial detainees.
But the rights of pretrial detainees are broader than those of con-
victed offenders, because the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments prohibit the imposition of any punishment before
conviction. Consequently, "conditions of confinement which may be
constitutional for sentenced inmates under the Eighth Amendment may
be unconstitutional for pre-trial detainees under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." '197 In accord with this principle, in Bell v. Wolfish the Supreme
Court held that unconvicted persons may not be subjected to conditions
of confinement that are punitive in nature. 9 A pretrial detainee's right
to be free from punishment goes to both the length of his pretrial deten-
tion and the right not to be subjected to conditions imposed for the pur-
pose of punishment.1 99 The proper inquiry with respect to the question
of whether a deaf pretrial detainee's due process rights have been vio-
lated, therefore, is whether, in refusing to provide reasonable accommo-
dations for the detainee's deafness, prison officials acted with intent to
punish the detainee. In that regard, "if a restriction or condition is not
reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-
a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental ac-
tion is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detain-
ees qua detainees."'2"°
While "maintaining institutional security and preserving internal or-
der and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or re-
traction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners
and pretrial detainees,"201 a restraint that" 'appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]'" is improperly punitive in na-
ture and violative of the due process rights of pretrial detainees.20 2 If the
restraint, however, is "an incident of a legitimate nonpunitive govern-
197. Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 595 F. Supp. 1417,
1428 (D.N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1731 (1988). But see Hamm v. DeKalb County,
774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986) ("in regard to provid-
ing pretrial detainees with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the
minimum standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the eighth
amendment for convicted prisoners"); accord Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1298 (1988); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.
1986); Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985); Whisenant v. Yuam,
739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984).
198. 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979).
199. Id. at 53543.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 546.
202. Id. at 538 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
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mental objective," it is not violative of the due process clause.20 3
Applying this test, courts have sometimes held that restraints or
conditions of confinement were impermissibly punitive and thus in con-
travention of the due process rights of prison detainees. Examples of
such impermissibly punitive prison conditions include overcrowded
prison conditions,2° the failure of prison officials to exercise proper su-
pervisory authority to remedy problems of violence,20 and the failure of
prison officials to allow pretrial detainees to have contact visits and regu-
lar access to outdoor recreation.20 6 It has also been held that a cause of
action under the due process clause is established when pretrial detainees
assert that they have been denied sufficient visiting privileges with family
and friends and sufficient telephone access in prison.2 7 The courts have
explicitly recognized that the "failure to provide a pretrial detainee with
an environment that does not impair his mental and emotional health is
punishment and violative of his Fourteenth Amendment rights."20 8 In
theory, at least, the restrictions and conditions placed on pretrial detain-
ees may not be any more restrictive than necessary to assure their pres-
ence at trial or to preserve security.2°9
In accord with this reasoning, it may be argued that the deliberate
refusal to provide deaf pretrial detainees with reasonable accommoda-
tions for their deafness, particularly the right to the assistance of quali-
fied interpreters during all prison proceedings and activities, is punitive
in nature.2"0 First, to imprison deaf pretrial detainees absent such accom-
203. Id. at 539 n.20.
204. E.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d
503 (8th Cir. 1980); Reece v. Gragg, 650 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Kan. 1986).
205. E.g., Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984).
206. E.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977).
207. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v.
Thorne, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
208. McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 762 (W.D. La. 1982) (citing Anderson v.
Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972)); Adams v.
Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1979). See also,
Duran, 542 F.2d at 1000. But ef. Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1272 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (stating that McMurry v. Phelps was wrongly decided insofar as the McMurry court
held that "'basic visitation is a right protected by the First Amendment: freedom of
association' ").
209. E.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d at 750.
210. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), the Supreme Court held that "the Due
Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss
of or injury to life, liberty or property." Id. at 328. In Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986), the Court held that, in accord with Daniels, "the protections of the Due Process
Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison
officials." Id. at 348. Under these rulings, it has been held that "[o]nly if the evidence suggests
that [prison officials] knew of the jails' conditions, or intended to force the detainees to endure
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modations is excessive in relation to the alternate purpose of reducing
expense and consequential administrative inconvenience, 211 and certainly
requires deaf pretrial detainees to be restrained in a manner that is more
restrictive than necessary to assure their presence at trial or to preserve
security. Second, imprisoning deaf pretrial detainees in facilities where
they are unable to communicate with fellow prisoners or guards, where
they are unable to understand what is happening at prison proceedings
they are forced to attend, and where they are unable to participate in any
of the rehabilitative, educational or recreational aspects of prison life,
will clearly impair the mental and emotional health of such detainees.
Accordingly, the failure to provide deaf pretrial detainees with interpret-
ers and other reasonable accommodations should be held to be punitive
and thus violative of the detainee's due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment.212
C. Summary
The discriminatory and disproportionate prison conditions suffered
by many deaf prison inmates should be held unconstitutional, as violative
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion.213 Unfortunately, however, to date the Supreme Court has not been
such conditions" would the principles enunciated in Bell v. Wo~flsh apply. Ortega v. Rowe,
796 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1887 (1987). Following
the reasoning of Ortega, deaf pretrial detainees would only have a cause of action against
prison officials under the fourteenth amendment if the officials were more than negligent; in
other words, if the officials knowingly or deliberately refused to provide reasonable accommo-
dations for deaf inmates.
211. The underlying rationale expressed by prison officials when refusing to provide deaf
prisoners with interpreters and other accommodations is generally that such accommodations
are expensive and no one has the time to bother with making appropriate arrangements to
obtain the necessary accommodations.
212. Note, however, that the success of this argument will depend upon the willingness of
the courts to interpret the-Constitution in light of the changing climate with respect to handi-
capped persons. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562, the Court made it clear when discussing
the fourteenth amendment rights of pretrial detainees that federal courts should not, "in the
name of the Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison opera-
tions." This statement is reflective of the general reluctance of the courts to find that prison
officials have violated the constitutional rights of prisoners, whether pretrial detainees or con-
victed offenders. Deaf pretrial detainees, therefore, as well as convicted deaf offenders, will
face a tough battle when claiming that their discriminatory and disproportionate prison condi-
tions are unconstitutional.
213. In addition, the refusal to provide a deaf prison inmate with the assistance of a quali-
fled interpreter at disciplinary hearings, grievance hearings (filed by or against the deaf in-
mate), or similar hearings, such as a "transfer" hearing to determine whether the prisoner
should be removed from an "honor-dorm" for qualified prisoners, should be held violative of
the procedural due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Absent the opportunity to
understand such proceedings, the deaf prison inmate is denied meaningful access to such pro-
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sympathetic to the plight of handicapped people, but has narrowly inter-
preted the laws relating to handicapped rights, causing severe setbacks to
the handicapped rights movement.214 Thus the current success of the
constitutional claims of deaf prison inmates is questionable, at best. It is
time, however, for deaf inmates to begin raising these constitutional
claims, if for no other reason than to make the courts-and the public-
ceedings, and the effect is the same as if the deaf prison inmate is not permitted to be present at
such hearings. While in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Supreme Court held that
hearings relating to the transfer of prisoners must only be conducted in a non-adversarial
evidentiary manner, the Court noted that in a transfer hearing, even when it is claimed that an
inmate represents a security threat and administrative segregation is at issue, the inmate must
"receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the
prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation."
Id. at 476. Similarly, in Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2462 (1987), the Ninth Circuit held that, even under the relaxed procedural
standard enunciated in Hewitt, "prison officials must inform the prisoner of the charges against
the prisoner or their reasons for considering segregation [and] allow the prisoner to present his
views." Absent the provision of a qualified interpreter, a deaf prison inmate will not be able to
fully understand the charges against him at a disciplinary or transfer hearing and will not be
able to "present his views."
214. Listed below are a few of the more egregious examples of the Supreme Court's narrow
reading of the handicapped rights laws:
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 2342 (1985), despite the fact that sec-
tion 504 was aimed at prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance-usually the
states-from discriminating against handicapped people, the Court held that the eleventh
amendment prohibited a state from being subject to suit in federal court for alleged violations
of section 504. To overturn the horrendous effect of this ruling, which would have effectively
nullified section 504, in 1986 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,
which provide that a state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment from a suit
brought in federal court for a violation of section 504. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7 (West Supp.
1988).
In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), the Court held that parents who prevailed in
claiming that a school district had failed to provide their handicapped child with a free appro-
priate education as required by the Education For All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-14 (1978), and had thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and having unfairly discriminated
on the basis of handicap in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, could not obtain
attorneys' fees under section 504 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides for an award of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action premised in part on constitutional claims.
To overturn the effect of this ruling, which made it implausible if not impossible for handi-
capped children to assert their rights to an appropriate education, Congress passed the Handi-
capped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1986), thus reversing Smith.
In United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986), the
Court held that commercial airlines are not subject to the nondiscrimination mandate of sec-
tion 504, because they are not technically recipients of federal financial assistance despite the
fact that airports and air traffic controller systems are subsidized by federal funds and airlines
cannot operate without airports and air traffic controllers. To assist in overturning the effect of
this ruling, on August 15, 1986, Congress amended section 404(a)(c)(1) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act to provide that "no air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise qualified hand-
icapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transportation." 49
App. U.S.C.A. § 1374(c)(1).
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aware of the inequities at issue and to serve as an impetus for a legislative
solution to the problem.
V. BROADENING STATE INTERPRETER STATUTES:
A PARTIAL SOLUTION
The most obvious legislative solution to the problem would be for
each of the individual states to enact statutory provisions aimed at equal-
izing the conditions of confinement for deaf and hearing prison inmates.
With respect to the most significantly required accommodation-that of
providing qualified interpreters to deaf prisoners during all prison pro-
ceedings and organized activities and programs-the problem could be
solved relatively simply by expanding current state interpreter laws.
In recognition of the communicative difficulties of deaf people,
forty-five states have enacted statutes providing for the appointment of
qualified interpreters for deaf persons involved in various aspects of our
criminal justice system. The statutes are diverse, and vary widely in cov-
erage. Some state statutes provide for the mandatory215 or discretion-
ary216 appointment of interpreters for deaf defendants at trial. Some
215. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (1987 Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-2101.1(a)
(1983 Supp.); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(b) (1988 Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-201 (1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-137K(b)(1) (1987 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907
(1986 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(2) (West 1987 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-
4004(a)(1) (1986 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-1402 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 622B.2 (West 1987 Supp.); IDAHO CRIM. RULE 28 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4351(b) (1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30 A.410(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 270(A) (West 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2)(A) (1987
Supp.); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 623A.(a) (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. cl. 221, § 92 A
(West 1988 Supp.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.55(103)(1) (Callaghan 1987 Supp.); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611.32(1) (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-303 (1987 Supp.); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 546.034.3 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 494-503(3)(a) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2403
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.051 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:2 (1987
Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-3 (1987 Supp.); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 390 (1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 80-2(a) (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-33-02(1) (1987 Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2311.14(A) (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 1278(a) (West 1986); S.C.
CODE ANN, § 15-27-110 (Law. Co-op. 1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 183.418(1) (1987); 1987 S.D.
LAWS § 19-3-10(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(3)(b)(1) (1987 Supp.); TEX. CalM. PROC.
CODE ANN. art. 38.31(a) (Vernon 1988 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-164.1 (1988 Supp.);
WASH. REv. CODE § 2.42.030 (1988); W. Va. Code § 57-5-7(a) (1988 Supp.); Wyo. STAT. § 5-
1-109(a) (1987 Supp.).
One state, Rhode Island, provides for mandatory provision of a deaf party who is a wit-
ness at trial. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-5-8 (1985).
216. ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 606-9 (1976); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-15(b) (1982); VERMONT RULES CRIM. PROC., Rule 28 (1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.42.030 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7(a) (1988 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 885.37(1)(b) (1987 Supp.).
Some states also provide for interpreters for deaf witnesses or complainants at trial. See,
e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (1987 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
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state statutes are broadly worded to provide for the appointment of inter-
preters upon arrest, to be utilized during custodial interrogations of sus-
pects,2"' while still others require the appointment of a qualified
interpreter when a grand jury questions a deaf suspect.218 A few state
statutes provide for the appointment of qualified interpreters to facilitate
communications between deaf suspects and their attorneys. 19 Even the
broadest of these state statutes, however, are not currently interpreted as
requiring the appointment of qualified interpreters to assist incarcerated
deaf persons during prison related proceedings, such as during intake
evaluations, psychological testing or evaluations, disciplinary hearings,
137K(b)(1) (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(2) (West 1988 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-
4004(a)(1) (1987 Supp.); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, para. 8-1402 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 622 B.2 (West 1987 Supp.); IDAHO CRIM. RULE 28 (1987); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.55(103)(1) (Callaghan 1988); Miss. COD-ANN. § 13-1-303(1) (1987 Supp.); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 546.034.2 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503(1) (1985); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 50.051 (Michie 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-8 (1987 Supp.); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 390 (Mc-
Kinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2(a) (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.14(A)
(1981); OKLA.'STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2409(A) (West 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-110 (Law.
Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(3)(b)(1) (1984).
Still other states provide for interpreters for deaf witnesses but not deaf complainants.
E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (1981); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(b) (West 1988 Supp.); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907 (1986 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A.410(1) (Michie 1985);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.30 (1988 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.37(1)(b)
(West 1987 Supp.).
A few state statutes provide for interpreters for deaf complainants but not witnesses. E.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. § 183.418 (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 5-1-109(a) (1987 Supp.).
217. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(C) (1987 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
137K(2) (1988 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 99-4002, 99-4005 (Harrison 1987 Supp.); MASs.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121, § 92 A (West 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.55(105)(1) (Calla-
ghan 1988 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.32(2) (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-
303(3) (1987 Supp.); Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.034.1 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-
503(3)(b) (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:3 (1987 Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-2(d)
(1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-33.02(2) (1987 Supp.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-3-
10(4) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(3)(b)(3) (1987 Supp.); WYO. STAT. § 5-1-109(a)
(1987 Supp).
218. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (1987 Supp.); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-201(a)
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(2) (1987 Supp.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B.2 (1987
Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4351(a) (1984); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30A.410(1) (Michie
1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.55(103)(1) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.32(1)
(West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-303(1) (1987 Supp.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503(3)
(1985); NEv. REv. STAT. § 50.050(2) (Michie 1986) (not specifically referring to grand juries
but to "all judicial proceedings in which a [deaf] person appears as a witness"); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 2409(A) (West 1984); 1987 S.D. LAWS § 19-3-10(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-
1-103(3)(b)(1) (1987 Supp.); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7(a) (1988 Supp.); Wyo. STAT. § 5-1-109(a)
(1987 Supp).
219. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (1987 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4006
(Harrison 1987 Supp.); TEX. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(b) (Vernon 1988 Supp.);
ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907 (1986 Supp.); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30 A.410 (1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
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parole hearings or the like, and none of the statutes provide for the ap-
pointment of interpreters during specific prison programs (i.e., meetings,
church services, lectures, group counseling sessions). Moreover, even the
most broadly worded interpreter statutes lack adequate enforcement
mechanisms, and as a result the applicable authorities frequently disre-
gard the statutes.220
Arizona, for example, has enacted one of the more broadly written
statutes in this area. Arizona Revised Statute section 12-242 provides for
the appointment of qualified interpreters:
in any civil or criminal case or grand jury proceeding in which
a deaf person is party to such action, either as a witness, com-
plainant, defendant or attorney... to interpret the proceedings
to the deaf person, to interpret the deaf person's testimony or
statements and to interpret preparations with the deaf person's
attorney.
Further, the statute requires the provision of a qualified interpreter
whenever a deaf person is taken into custody, to interpret while the deaf
person is provided with Miranda warnings, during the deaf person's in-
terrogation, and during the giving of any statement by the deaf person.221
Although section 12-242 has been on the books for over five years,
the statute continues to be ignored or disregarded. For example, in the
1987 case involving a deaf defendant, Chris Gallino,222 the police bla-
tantly disregarded the mandate of section 12-242 that a qualified inter-
preter be provided to interpret "[w]arnings of [Gallino's] constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination as it relates to custodial interroga-
tion," the "interrogation of [Gallino]," and "Gallino's statements.1 223
Rather, the officers attempted to rely on the "interpretation" provided by
a fellow police officer, Detective Samuel Grimes, whose own knowledge
of sign language is negligible and who was unable to meaningfully com-
municate with Gallino. Subsequently, Gallino moved to suppress his
statement. For a period of several months, the parties engaged in lengthy
and costly hearings, to elicit testimony from several expert witnesses
throughout the country. As a result of the hearings, the court granted
Gallino's motion to suppress. 224
220. One author has noted that "[e]ven in those states that require the police to make sign
language interpreters available [to deaf suspects], police officers do not always locate interpret-
ers after arresting deaf suspects." Comment, Protecting Deaf Suspects' Right to Understand
Criminal Proceedings 75 J. of CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 166, 173-74.
221. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242 (1982).
222. See infra text accompanying notes 238-304
223. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(C)(1)(2)(3)(1982).
224. Order of Sept. 11, 1987.
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Despite the publicized Gallino fiasco, the Arizona police continued
to improperly utilize the services of Detective Grimes as an "interpreter"
for deaf people embroiled in Arizona's criminal justice system. In the
case of State v. Nordmanz.. a deaf woman, Ms. Simms, was a witness to a
murder involving three co-defendants. The policemen responsible for in-
vestigating the homicide requested that Detective Grimes assist them in
their investigation by interpreting for Ms. Simms while they questioned
her about the events she witnessed.226 Detective Grimes explained that
he was not qualified to interpret for the witness and that litigation was
currently ongoing based on allegations that under Arizona law he was
not qualified to interpret for deaf persons embroiled in the criminal jus-
tice system (i.e., the Gallino hearings).227 Detective Grimes was in-
formed that the Nordman case differed from the Gallino case because
Ms. Simms was not a suspect, but a witness.228 Accordingly, Detective
Grimes "interpreted" for Ms. Simms while she was interviewed by the
police, and accompanied Ms. Simms to the police station and interpreted
for her while shie observed a line-up of suspects, identified each co-de-
fendant, and explained the part that each co-defendant played in the
murder.229
Subsequently, the State reinterviewed Ms. Simms with the aid of a
qualified interpreter who was fluent in ASL (Ms. Simms' primary lan-
guage). A qualified interpreter was also utilized when Ms. Simms testi-
fied at trial.2 30 While the statements that Ms. Simms made at the second
interview and at trial (via qualified interpreters) were consistent with one
another, those statements were somewhat inconsistent with the statement
that Detective Grimes had attributed to Ms. Simms during the first po-
lice interview.231 The defendants in Nordman made an issue of inconsis-
tencies, and the State attempted to suppress the statement made by Ms.
Simms to Detective Grimes on the basis that Detective Grimes was un-
qualified to interpret sign language.232 Despite the fact that Detective
Grimes testified in court that he was not qualified to interpret Ms.
Simms' statements, the court allowed the statements made by Ms. Simms
225. State v. Nordman, Arizona Superior Court, County of Maricopa (No. 87-02256). See
letter from James Blake, Maricopa County Deputy County Attorney (prosecutor for the Nord-
man action) to the author (Nov. 24, 1987).
226. Letter from Helen Young, nationally certified interpreter for the deaf, to the author
(Oct. 1, 1987) at 2.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Blake letter, supra note 225.
231. Id.; Young letter, supra note 226, at 2.
232. Id.
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through Detective Grimes to be received into evidence.233
Notwithstanding that Arizona's statute requires the provision of
qualified interpreters "in any proceeding before [a state] department,
board, commission, agency or licensing authority in which a deaf person
is a principal party of interest or witness," '234 that statute has been con-
sistently interpreted as having no application to prison administrative
hearings conducted by the State Department of Corrections, such as in-
take hearings to determine appropriate placement (i.e., maximum or
minimum security), psychological evaluations, disciplinary hearings, pa-
role board hearings and other committee hearings that are routinely held
within correctional facilities.235 And the statute clearly does not require
233. Id.
234. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(B).
235. Young letter, supra note 226, at 4-5; Letter from Scott Loos, Coordinator of Interpret-
ing Services for the Maricopa County Court System, to the author (Dec. 9, 1987); Letter from
Stuart Brackney, Director, Arizona Council for the Hearing Impaired, to the author (Dec. 4,
1987); Telephone conversation of December 3, 1987 between the author and Craig Phillips,
Classification Manager, Arizona Department of Corrections.
According to Mr. Phillips, in situations involving deaf prisoners the prison authorities will
see if a staff person or another inmate can be found who knows some sign language; if no such
person is available the authorities will "have to make do somehow." Staff persons and other
inmates who may know some sign language, however, are hardly qualified to interpret for a
deaf prisoner; indeed, they are often less equipped to provide such services than someone like
Detective Samuel Grimes. Moreover, deaf prisoners will often refuse to speak about private or
confidential matters in the presence of staff and fellow inmates, and strongly object to the
presence of such third persons at hearings where personal concerns are at issue. As for "mak-
ing do" when no staff person or inmate is available to attempt to "interpret," presumably that
"solution" involves writing notes, which, as previously explained (see supra text accompanying
notes 3-6 and 31-33), is a totally ineffective means of communicating with most deaf prisoners.
Occasionally the courts will attempt to alleviate this problem by ordering prison officials
to provide qualified interpreters for deaf inmates during certain prison proceedings. In Mari-
copa County, Arizona, for example, courts on at least two occasions ordered prison officials at
Alhambra prison to provide interpreters for deaf inmates during intake assessment hearings.
See, e.g., Order of June 9, 1987 in State v. Cofield, Maricopa County, Ariz. Super. Ct. No. CR-
156477 (ordering that a certified ASL interpreter be appointed to assist the defendant in all
communications concerning evaluations for placement within the Arizona Department of Cor-
rections). Unfortunately, Helen Young, a nationally certified interpreter for the deaf, in Phoe-
nix, Arizona, reports that both of these orders were disregarded.
The problem is further compounded by the small number of interpreters who are certified
as qualified to interpret during legal proceedings and the very high fees charged by interpret-
ers. In Arizona, for example, there is only one certified "legal" interpreter for deaf persons
and one interpreter awaiting legal certification, and the current going rate for legal interpreters
is approximately $45.00 per hour. (Telephone conversation of December 3, 1987 between the
author and Stuart Brackney, Executive Director of the Arizona Council for the Hearing Im-
paired; personal conversations during November and December 1987 between the author and
Helen Young, certified interpreter for the deaf, Phoenix, Arizona.) One commentator has
noted,
Many interpreters hesitate before working in legal proceedings because the risks are
high. They may be subject to malpractice suits if they err; the pay is low-payment is
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the provision of interpreters for deaf persons seeking to take part in the
rehabilitative aspects of prison life (such as counseling sessions, lectures,
church services, and educational programs). It would be relatively sim-
ple, however, to amend Arizona's interpreter statute to: (1) require the
provision of qualified interpreters during all prison related proceedings
and organized activities (when such services are requested by a deaf in-
mate); and (2) provide for the promulgation of heavy sanctions against
state agencies (including state departments of corrections) that refuse to
follow the statute. Other states could enact similar statutory provisions.
While the enactment of such statutes would not solve all of the inequities
faced by deaf prison inmates, the statutes would alleviate a major portion
of those inequities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due largely in part to their complex communication and cultural
differences, the conditions of confinement suffered by many deaf prison
inmates are unconscionably disproportionate and discriminatory.
Although the inequities suffered by deaf prisoners cannot practicably be
totally eliminated, the unjust treatment inflicted upon deaf inmates can
be greatly alleviated by the provision of reasonable accommodations that
will assist in equalizing the conditions under which deaf prisoners are
confined.
The real tragedies underlying the unjust manner in which our soci-
ety treats its deaf criminals are that the system fails to make even a pre-
tense of rehabilitating deaf prisoners, and that the system condones,
perhaps even encourages, cruelty towards, and unjust treatment of, a seg-
ment of our population. Requiring deaf criminals to serve prison
sentences under circumstances that are at best counter-productive, and at
worst horrifying, is a self-defeating proposition. We should expect more
from our criminal justice system. In Utopia we would confine all deaf
prisoners together in separate wards that are not operated by guards talk-
ing through loudspeakers or via hidden cameras with speakers; where
deaf prisoners are guarded by guards who are proficient in sign language;
where full time interpreters are provided for all prison proceedings,
counseling groups, classes, job training, and other activities; where spe-
cial tests are given to determine capability for job training; where a de-
coder is placed in the unit TV and a TDD is placed in the deaf prisoners'
usually either set by statute or determined at the court's discretion, and is often be-
low the going rate; and the work is difficult since there are no signs for many legal
terms.
Shipley, supra note 6, at 14.
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day room; and where the time limits are extended for TDD calls and
visits to deaf prisoners. This is not Utopia, however, and the relatively
small number of deaf prisoners in a given jurisdiction make such a
scheme impractical, at best.236 But a practical solution is possible.
Deaf prisoners and their counsel should educate the public and the
236. Pursuant to this author's request, the United States Department of Justice compiled
statistics regarding the number of deaf prisoners in federal prisons. According to that study,
there are currently only two profoundly deaf prisoners within the forty-seven federal prisons
(although there are numerous hearing-impaired prisoners within those prisons). Telephone
conversation of February 16, 1988 between the author and G. Radford Clark of the United
States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Medical Services Division.
There are no statistics available concerning the number of deaf prisoners in state or local
correctional facilities throughout the United States. To obtain a representative sample of the
number of deaf prisoners in each state, the author requested information about the number of
deaf prisoners under the jurisdictidti of the departments of correction of the states of Arizona,
California, Florida and New York, and of the District of Columbia. Following is a summary
of the information obtained:
a. Arizona: As of November 16, 1987 there were nineteen hearing impaired inmates
scattered throughout six correctional facilities in Arizona. Letter from Michael A. Arra, Ari-
zona Department of Corrections Public Information Officer, to the author (Nov. 16, 1987).
Almost all of these inmates, however, are hard-of-hearing, rather than profoundly deaf. The
author has been made aware of only two profoundly deaf inmates among these nineteen indi-
viduals.
b. California: According to Michael Van Winkle, Information Officer of the California
State Department of Corrections, California does not contain a "category in its classification
procedures" for deaf inmates, and no information is available with respect to the number of
deaf inmates scattered throughout California's sixteen prisons and thirty-four minimum secur-
ity camps. Telephone conversation of November 9, 1987 between Mr. Van Winkle and the
author's secretary, Carla Gard.
c. Florida: According to Emile Baudoind'Ajoux, Impaired Inmate Services for the
Florida State Department of Corrections, as of November 9, 1987 there were five profoundly
deaf inmates and fifty hearing-impaired inmates scattered throughout Florida's thirty-six pris-
ons. Telephone conversation of November 9, 1987 between Mr. Baudoind'Ajoux and the au-
thor's secretary, Carla Gard.
d. New York: According to Ms. Nancy Hickey, Instructor, Seriously Disabled Unit,
Eastern New York Correctional Facility, as of November 20, 1987 there were three profoundly
deaf inmates and two hearing impaired inmates housed in the Eastern Correctional Facility
(described below). Telephone conversation of November 20, 1987 between Ms. Hickey and
the author's secretary, Carla Gard.
e. District of Columbia: According to Ms. Arlene Kelliebrew, Assistant to the Public
Affairs Specialist of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, as of December 7,
1987 there were two profoundly deaf inmates and three hearing impaired inmates scattered
throughout the District of Columbia's nine prisons, one detention center and eight half-way
houses. Telephone conversation of December 7, 1987 between Ms. Kelliebrew and the au-
thor's secretary, Carla Gard.
Despite these small numbers, one state does have special prison facilities for deaf prison-
ers. In 1985 the state of New York established a pioneer program for prisoners who are hear-
ing or visually impaired in the basement of The Eastern Correctional Facility, a maximum
security prison. One of the first prisoners to enter the special program, Patrick Fenton, ex-
pressed his relief at being able to converse in sign language with other prisoners, stating
through sign language that during his six years in prison prior to "arriving at Eastern he had
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courts about the inequities that currently exist between deaf and hearing
prisoners, and should demand that prison officials provide reasonable ac-
commodations to alleviate those inequities. A realistic approach to the
reasonable accommodation standard as applied to deaf prisoners should
yield the following results: deaf prisoners should not expect to be housed
in units with other deaf prisoners, guarded by guards who know sign
language, or provided with full time interpreting assistance, because such
accommodations would require substantial or fundamental changes in
the nature of the prison program. Deaf prisoners should, however, ex-
pect to have equal access to the telephone via TDD, access to a television
set with a decoder, extended visiting hours where necessary, and the op-
portunity to participate in job training notwithstanding the inability to
succeed on standardized achievement tests. Where the doors of the pris-
oners' cells are operated electronically after announcements, the cells of
deaf prisoners should be equipped with a light that flashes when the cell
doors are opening. Most importantly, however, deaf prisoners should
expect to be provided with the services of qualified interpreters during all
prison proceedings, such as during intake examinations, psychiatric in-
terviews, disciplinary reviews or hearings, parole hearings and proce-
dural hearings within the prison to determine whether a prisoner's
"status" should be changed. Deaf prisoners should alsobe provided with
interpreters during all rehabilitative aspects of the prison program (e.g.,
counseling, job training, self-help programs, lectures, classes, and church
services).
When the prison is a recipient of federal financial assistance, section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act should be interpreted as requiring that
such accommodations be made. When section 504 is not applicable, the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution should be inter-
preted in accord with the evolving moral climate of our society, which
now gives due recognition to the equal rights of our handicapped
citizens.
In addition, individual states should expand their current statutes
relating to the provision of interpreters for deaf persons embroiled in our
criminal justice system, to incorporate mandatory requirements for the
provision of qualified interpreters to assist deaf prison inmates during all
prison proceedings and programs.237
no one to talk with because 'no one knows sign language."' L.A. Times, March 24, 1985,
supra note 33, at 12, col. 1.
237. As this article went to print, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an opinion in
Bonner v. Lewis, No. 87-2663, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1988), holding, inter alia, as follows:
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(1) A deaf prison inmate who alleged that the prison's failure to provide him with inter-
preter services during disciplinary and administrative hearings and while receiving counseling
and medical services (a) was an "otherwise qualified" individual under section 504, and
(b) could assert a claim under section 504 against the prison because the prison constituted a
"program or activity" under section 504. Id. at 11220-21.
(2) The prison's failure to provide a deaf prison inmate with interpreter services did not
violate the prisoner's right to equal protection, because the failure to do so based on cost
considerations would be reasonable under the rational relation test. Id. at 11226.
(3) The prison's refusal to provide a deaf prison inmate with a qualified interpreter did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. Id.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the prison based on the prisoner's constitutional claims, and reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the prison based on the prisoner's section 504
claim. The case was remanded to the district court for consideration of the factual questions
relating to the issue of whether the prison official's refusal to provide the deaf inmate with
qualified interpreter services impermissibly discriminated against the inmate in violation of
section 504.
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APPENDIX
The immense complexity of the language difficulties facing deaf peo-
ple in our criminal justice system, and the need for deaf people embroiled
in our criminal justice system to be provided with the services of a quali-
fied interpreter, can best be explained by examining a sample case. In
State v. Gallino,238 the alleged confession of an intelligent," 9 deaf high
school graduate charged with murder was suppressed because the sus-
pect was not provided with the assistance of a qualified sign language
interpreter when given the required warnings under the Supreme Court's
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.24 The relevant facts and evidence are as
follows:
On January 2, 1986 two police officers investigating the death of an
unidentified young man visited Chris Gallino, a twenty year-old pro-
foundly deaf man, at his place of employment to determine the victim's
identity.2 4 1 Subsequently, after learning that the victim was Martin
Lewis Eslinger and that Mr. Eslinger purportedly had left home to
purchase a car from his friend, Chris, two policemen again visited Mr.
Gallino on January 3, at his home to talk more about Mr. Eslinger and
Chris Gallino.242  The policemen requested that another policeman,
Detective Samuel Grimes, accompany them to visit Gallino because
238. No. CR-154416 (Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, County of Maricopa, Order
of September 11, 1987).
239. See, e.g., Transcript of the March 20, 1987 hearing before the Hon. Daniel E. Nastro,
Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Maricopa (No. CR-154416),
testimony of Theresa Smith, at 71 [hereinafter Smith Testimony]; Transcript of July 24, 1987
hearing in the same matter, testimony of Dr. McKay Vernon, at 17-21 [hereinafter Vernon
Testimony] (Dr. Vernon administered several intelligence tests to Mr. Gallino and determined
that Mr. Gallino is "in the upper 20 to 30 percent of the population relative to intelligence.")
Id. at 21.
240. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under the Miranda rule officers interrogating a suspect after he
has been taken into custody must inform the suspect that: 1) "he has a right to remain silent;"
2) "any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him;" 3) "he has the right to
the presence of an attorney;" and 4) "if he cannot afford an attorney he is entitled to the
assistance of a court appointed attorney." Id. at 444. Throughout its opinion, the Court made
it clear that the warnings provided to a suspect must be complete and effective. Id. at 444, 479.
The requirement that deaf suspects be provided Miranda warnings in a manner that en-
sures their understanding of such warnings has been comprehensively discussed by other au-
thors and will not be discussed herein. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 220, at 171-77. The
Gallino case involving the effectiveness of Miranda warnings given to a deaf suspect is de-
scribed herein solely because it serves to illuminate the enormity of the language barriers con-
fronting most deaf prisoners and suspects.
241. Transcript of January 30, 1987 proceedings before the Hon. Daniel E. Nastro, Judge of
the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Maricopa, (No. CR-154416), testimony
of Detective Russell P. Kimball of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, at 12-13 [hereinafter
Kimball testimony].
242. Id. at 18, 19.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Detective Grimes' parents were deaf and he knew some sign language.243
The policemen arrived at Gallino's home and, with the assistance of
Detective Grimes, told Gallino that they wanted to talk to him about the
Eslinger homicide.2' Gallino then accompanied the officers to the Sher-
iff's Department, where they arrived at approximately 6:45 p.m.245
Police Detective Russell Kimball began asking Gallino questions,
which Detective Grimes attempted to translate into some form of sign
language. Gallino would then "respond verbally when he could but in
sign to Detective Grimes who would usually repeat the answers. ' 246 Af-
ter much question and answer, during which Gallino described what he
had done on the nights of December 30 and 31 and discussed conversa-
tions with Eslinger involving the latter's possible purchase of Gallino's
car, according to Detective Kimball the detectives "asked if [Gallino]
knew who killed Marty [Eslinger] and he said he didn't. We asked him
again if he killed Marty and he said no, and we asked him again if he
killed Marty and he said I guess."2 47 After Gallino's statement of "I
guess," the detectives "asked him why, and his words were, 'I fucked
UP.'-248 The detectives then "asked him how, and he said with a
gun."
249
At that point Detective Grimes "advised [Gallino] of his right to
remain silent from a standard Miranda warning card. 2 0 Detective
Grimes also "went through a little explanation period" when he "ver-
bally and in sign" informed Gallino of his rights and asked Gallino if he
would voluntarily talk with the police.251 The detectives then gave Gal-
lino a voluntary statement form, which included the Miranda warnings,
and obtained a written statement from Gallino.25 2 Gallino initialed the
statement in three places next to the printed Miranda warnings and
signed the statement.25 3 Subsequently, Gallino and the officers drove to
the approximate location where the death occurred; Gallino pointed out
a "portion of the roadway along which he said.., he threw the gun and
the wallet out."'254 Gallino was then booked in the Maricopa County jail
243. Id. at 19.
244. Id. at 21.
245. Id. at 21-22.
246. Id. at 22.
247. Id. at 23.
248. Id. at 24.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 23, 24.
251. Id. at 26.
252. Id. at 32.
253. Id. at 33-35.
254. Id. at 35.
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and charged with first degree murder and armed robbery.25 5
A tape recording was made of the interrogation of Chris Gallino
conducted by Detectives Kimball and Grimes on the third of January.
As evidenced by the tape, at one point during the questioning (after Gal-
lino had been provided his Miranda warnings) Gallino stated that he
wanted an attorney, but could not afford one. Detective Grimes, serving
in his capacity as an interpreter, then informed Detective Kimball that
"he wants an attorney" but that Gallino had stated he could not afford
an attorney.256 Based on the entirety of Gallino's testimony, however,
Detective Kimball interpreted those statements as meaning that Gallino
did not want an attorney at the moment, but would want an attorney
eventually, at which point he would not be able to afford an attorney.257
Detective Grimes testified that as the son of deaf parents he had
learned some sign language from his parents, but "for the most part ex-
cept for some ... more familiar signs, when [Grimes] would speak to
[his] folks or speak for them [Grimes] would finger spell."' 258 In short,
Detective Grimes was "basically a finger speller," '259 who "didn't under-
255. Id. at 36.
256. Transcript of March 6, 1987 hearing before the Hon. Daniel E. Nastro, Judge of the
Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Maricopa (No. CR-154416), testimony of
Detective Russell P. Kimball, at 26-28 [hereinafter Kimball Testimony II]; Transcript of
March 6, 1987 hearing in the same matter, testimony of Detective Samuel Grimes, pp. 97-100
[hereinafter Grimes Testimony].
257. Kimball Testimony II, supra note 256, at 20-36. Subsequently, when giving Gallino
his Miranda warnings prior to attempting to obtain his assistance in gathering evidence, the
police disregarded acknowledged confusion about whether Gallino felt threatened. Deputy
Sheriff John Coppock of the Maricopa County Sheriff's office testified that on January 4, 1987
he contacted Gallino at the Maricopa County Jail for the purpose of asking "Chris if he would
take us back into the field and show us where the gun and wallet were located.... ." Transcript
of March 20, 1987 hearing before the Hon. Daniel Nastro, Judge of the Superior Court of
Arizona, County of Maricopa (No. CR-154416); testimony of Deputy Sheriff John Coppock,
at 26. Sheriff Coppock testified that when writing notes back and forth with Gallino, the
questions and answers went as follows:
I wrote, '[Chris], it's really important to us that we're sure --' sure is underlined
'that you understand your rights and that you do not have to go with us to help us
find the pistol and wallet. Are you sure you understand your rights?' He responded
with 'Yes.' 'Has anyone promised you anything if you cooperate?' 'He put down
No.' 'Has anybody threatened you in any way?' He put down 'Yes.' 'Are you afraid
of us in any way?' He said, 'A little bit.'
Id. at 30. Shortly thereafter Sheriff Coppock requested that Detective Grimes "assist [Cop-
pock] in clarification of whether or not [Gallino] had, in fact, been threatened." Id. at 31.
When asked how that issue was clarified, Sheriff Coppock responded "I asked [Detective
Grimes] what [Gallino] meant by the fact he had been threatened, and [Detective Grimes]
stated that there was some confusion on that, that he couldn't determine that he had been
threatened." Id.
258. Grimes Testimony, supra note 256, at 71-74.
259. Id. at 45.
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stand a lot of signs.''26° As noted by Detective Grimes, finger spelling
involves making alphabet signs with the hands, and spelling each word as
it is stated.261 One who is "finger spelling in English words or a sentence
... [is] speaking the English language... by signing each individual
letter of each individual word .... 262 As previously explained, how-
ever, the various forms of sign language are different languages than Eng-
lish.2 63 In general, when sign language is used words are not spelled
letter by letter, but are signed by a symbol representing an entire word or
an entire phrase.2 4
Detective Grimes was not conversant in American Sign Language
or Pidgin Sign Language (PSE),2 65 the primary languages spoken by
Chris Gallino, and thus had problems understanding what Mr. Gallino
was signing to him.2 66 Detective Grimes also had no knowledge of Mr.
Gallino's reading level of the English language. 267 Despite those factors,
and despite the fact that Detective Grimes was not an impartial person
serving as an interpreter for Mr. Gallino, but was serving in the dual
(and conflicting) roles of interpreter and police interrogator, it was
Detective Grimes that "interpreted" the Miranda warnings for Mr.
Gallino.
At the hearing conducted as a result of defendant's motion to sup-
press Gallino's confession as being obtained absent proper Miranda
warnings, the defense introduced the testimony of three expert witnesses.
The first expert, Theresa Smith, a certified interpreter for the deaf and
college professor of interpreting principles, reviewed Chris Gallino's
260. Id. at 74.
261. Id. at 45.
262. Smith Testimony, supra note 239, at 52-54.
263. See KREESE & KLEVEN, supra note 1.
264. It has been stated that:
Fluent practitioners of ASL can convey "all the range and diversity of expression
possible in any language." ASL uses signals, hand gestures, facial expressions and
body movements to convey a rich variety of messages.
ASL's grammar is in the movement of signs. For example, a particular repeti-
tive movement of some signs will change them from verbs to nouns; other repetitive
movements of these same signs will signify the use of adverbs with meanings such as
regularly, frequently or continually. As in languages such as Latin, Navajo and Rus-
sian, ASL relies heavily on inflection to convey a great variety of information by
varying a root sign.
KREssE & KLEVIN, supra note 1, at 4.
265. During the continuation of the March 6, 1987 hearing on March 20, 1987, an expert
witness, a sign language interpreter, was requested to sign some sentences to Detective Grimes
in ASL and PSE. Detective Grimes was unable to understand what the expert was trying to
state. Transcript f March 20, 1987 hearing, testimony of Detective Samuel Grimes, at 13-15,
19-20 [hereinafter Grimes Testimony II].
266. Id. at 78.
267. Grimes Testimony II, supra note 265, at 5-7.
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school file (including the results of standard achievement tests and teach-
ers' notes) and police reports of the events relating to Gallino's confes-
sion. Professer Smith also interviewed Gallino for the purpose of
determining his proficiency in sign language and his understanding of
general topics of common knowledge that would evidence his general
ability to understand his constitutional rights. 68 When Ms. Smith asked
Gallino what the government is, what a legislature is and how a legisla-
ture gets elected, Gallino responded that the government "pay[s] for
things" '269 and that the purpose of a legislature was to "help all peo-
ple."27 0 When asked what senators were, Gallino responded that "they
have meetings." '71 When Ms. Smith asked, "If I wanted to be a senator,
how would I do that?," Gallino responded, "Well, if you're good you
know how."272 In response to Ms. Smith's query "how would I get the
job? Where would I go to apply for the job.., as a senator?," Gallino
replied: "Well, they have groups. They go together in meetings and they
vote."273 Gallino was apparently not aware of the concept of constitu-
tional rights prior to being placed in jail.27a Gallino had not heard about
"the Iran problem with Reagan," and although he "was aware of the
Challenger... he was not aware of any of the involvement of NASA." '275
Ms. Smith testified that Gallino's English vocabulary skills were at
the third grade level.276 Ms. Smith further testified that Gallino is not
fluent in ASL, but that based upon the Foreign Service five-point scale
for evaluating an individual's command of language, Gallino's command
of ASL is only at level two. 77 According to Ms. Smith, although Gal-
268. Smith Testimony, supra note 239, at 65-67.
269. Id. at 68-69. As explained by Ms. Smith, this view of government as an organization
that "pay[s] for things" is "consistent with how deaf people generally view what government
does" because of the "numerous social service agencies that are set up to serve deaf people"
with respect to education and employment. Id.
270. Id. at 69.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 69-70.
275. Id. at 68.
276. Id. at 71. As explained by Ms. Smith, however:
that is the reading vocabulary of an eight-year old. So that if I were to write some-
thing out for my eight-year old, and if she could read it, that would be roughly the
vocabularly level that Chris would have. That does not mean if I said it to my eight-
year old and she understood that, that he would be able to understand it, because my
eight-year old child-hearing child-would be able to understand much more orally
or verbally than he would be able to read in terms of vocabulary.
Id. at 72-73.
277. Id. at 76-78. The five points of the foreign service scale are as follows: level one in-
cludes survival level communication skills (i.e., where is the bathroom?); level two includes the
ability to carry on ordinary conversation (i.e., how was your weekend?); level three includes
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lino is somewhat more comfortable with PSE, he is no more fluent in
PSE than in ASL.27s Based on the above information, Ms. Smith con-
cluded that before Gallino could understand the Miranda warnings an
interpreter would have to take a great deal of time to explain the basic
concepts involved via the use of elementary ASL or PSE.27 9
Ms. Smith explained, for example, that the concept of the "right to
remain silent" would be particularly difficult for Gallino to compre-
hend.2"' The complexity of explaining via PSE and ASL that the right to
remain silent encompasses not only the right to refrain to volunteer infor-
mation, but the right to refuse to answer questions-not only for this
instance, but for "the duration"-is compounded by the fact that deaf
people are generally "accommodating to people who are able to hear and
speak." ' Ms. Smith opined that Gallino's repeated "yes" responses to
the detectives' questions about Gallino's understanding of the Miranda
warnings were representative of a common strategy employed by deaf
people of "just saying yes to everything" they are asked by hearing peo-
ple in positions of power and authority.28 2
The second witness testifying on behalf of Gallino was Dr. Robert
Johnson, Chairperson of the Linguistics and Interpreting Department of
Gallaudet College.283 After reviewing audio and video tapes of Detective
Grimes' interpretation of the Miranda warnings to Gallino, Dr. Johnson
concluded that the interpretation provided by Detective Grimes was in-
adequate in several ways.
Initially, Dr. Johnson noted that Detective Grimes' interpretation
was ethically inadequate. An interpreter is bound by ethical constraints
to: (1) stop the proceedings if there is a breakdown in communication;
the ability to communicate within your working environment (which includes any special vo-
cabularly terms used in your work place); level four includes the ability to converse as an
average native speaker (i.e., to talk about sports or the Challenger); level five involves the
ability to converse as an educated native speaker. Id.
278. Id. at 53, 78.
279. Id. at 82-86.
280. Id. at 84.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 84-86.
283. Transcript of June 18, 1987 hearing before the Hon. Daniel E. Nastro, Judge of the
Superior Court of the State of Arizona, County of Maricopa (No. CR-154416), testimony of
Dr. Robert Johnson, at 9-11.
Gallaudet College is a college for deaf people, and has 2,000 deaf students. The Linguis-
tics and Interpreting Department offers a masters' degree program that focuses on the study of
the structure of ASL and other sign languages, and a bachelor of arts program in interpreting.
The Department also provides all the interpreting services for Gallaudet University students,
and thus Dr. Johnson supervises 150 interpreters who provide approximately 26,000 hours of
interpreting a year.
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(2) make all communications accessible to both parties; (3) refrain from
participating in discussions about what is happening (i.e., remain neu-
tral); (4) avoid being in a position of authority which might intimidate
the deaf person (to avoid the "acquiescence to authority figure" syn-
drome); and (5) refrain from speaking for one of the parties to the com-
munication.284 Dr. Johnson explained that Detective Grimes violated all
of these ethical precepts.
First, although Detective Grimes noticed several times that commu-
nication between he and Gallino had broken down, he did not withdraw
as an interpreter.285 Second, Detective Grimes often had "side discus-
sions" with the other police officers interrogating Mr. Gallino about the
direction they should take in continuing the interrogation; communica-
tions that were "secret" in that they were not translated to Gallino.2 86 In
this regard, Detective Grimes was "deciding on the direction of the pro-
ceedings rather than just communicating . . . or translating them.
287
Third, Detective Grimes took a substantive role in the interrogation
rather than remaining in the neutral role of an interpreter. His goal was
to obtain information on behalf of the police rather than to simply trans-
mit information.28 8 Fourth, Detective Grimes was a frightening author-
ity figure to Gallino, who participated in Gallino's interrogation. Fifth,
Detective Grimes improperly spoke for Gallino, answering questions
posed by the police officers such as "what is Gallino thinking about?"
289
The second manner in which Dr. Johnson deemed Detective
Grimes' interpretation inadequate has its roots in the fact that Gallino
lacked both a cultural and linguistic understanding of the information
presented to him and Detective Grimes did nothing to alleviate that
problem. In order to comprehend the concept of "rights," for example,
one must have a cultural understanding of how our legal system works
and how the concept of constitutional rights fits within that legal sys-
tem.290 Dr. Johnson noted that a "yes" answer from Gallino to the ques-
tion "do you understand these rights?" might mean "yes I understand
284. Id. at 27-31.
285. Several times Detective Grimes said "I'm lost on this;" "I'm lost here;" "I can't quite
figure out what he's trying to tell me;" "I don't quite understand what he's trying to tell me;"
"I'm having trouble understanding what he's trying to tell me;" "I'm not that proficient at it."
Id. at 33-34.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 33.
288. Detective Grimes asked Mr. Gallino: "Are you afraid of us? We won't hurt you." In
other words, Detective Grimes "represent[ed] himself as one of the people who was controlling
the situation." Id. at 34.
289. Id. at 31-36.
290. Id. at 39.
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what you said," but that due to Gallino's cultural background he would
not understand the concept of "rights" and would not understand what it
means to give up his rights. In other words, Gallino could not know that
replying "yes" to that question might imply that he was giving up his
rights.29' Dr. Johnson opined that Gallino lacked both the necessary
cultural and linguistical background to understand the Miranda warn-
ings. When testing Gallino's linguistic comprehension of words used in
the Miranda warnings Dr. Johnson determined that Galino did not have
any knowledge or understanding of the words "manner," "offense,"
"herein," "advised," or "leniency." '292 Dr. Johnson noted that the state-
ments made to Gallino consisted of "extremely long and convoluted
sentences" which would be "virtually impossible" for Gallino to
comprehend.293
The third major problem identified by Dr. Johnson with respect to
Detective Grimes' interpretation involved the Detective's inability to se-
lect the most effective means of communicating the Miranda warnings to
Gallino given the latter's language skills and cultural and linguistic back-
ground.294 Not only did Detective Grimes lack the training or back-
ground to determine which variety of language would prove most
effective in overcoming Gallino's language barrier, but Detective Grimes
himself was only capable of "translat[ing] English into English" by the
use of finger spelling and a few signs.29 5 Indeed, Dr. Johnson observed
significant errors in Detective Grimes' finger spelling and signing.296
Rather than signing "I am required by law," for example, Detective
Grimes actually signed "I am required by illegal. ' 297 Many words were
finger-spelled incorrectly.298
The final expert witness testifying on behalf of the defense was Dr.
McKay Vernon, a college professor of psychology and a private psychol-
ogist specializing in working with deaf patients.299 Dr. Vernon adminis-
291. Id. at 57.
292. Id. at 46.
293. Id. at 45.
294. Id. at 58.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 51-52.
297. Id.
298. The word "assist" was spelled "assisslt." The word "cannot" was spelled "cannolt."
The word "attorney" was spelled once as "atteorney" and once as "attoreney." The word
"appointed" was spelled "appeinted." The word "prior" was spelled "preor." The word
"these" was spelled "taes." Id. at 51, 56.
299. Dr. Vernon teaches, inter alia, a course entitled Psychology of Deafness and a course
on psychological testing at Western Maryland College, where professionals are trained to work
in the field of deafness. Vernon Testimony, supra note 239, at 7.
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tered several psychological and intelligence tests to Gallino, and
interviewed Gallino for two and a half to three hours.3°' According to
Dr. Vernon, it is "just... impossible" that Gallino could have under-
stood the Miranda warnings given him; Dr. Vernon remained "totally
convinced" that Gallino was not able to understand the Miranda warn-
ings interpreted to him by Detective Grimes.30 1 Despite Gallino's high
intelligence, his cultural and linguistic difficulties led Dr. Vernon to con-
clude that it would take an expertly trained interpreter such as Theresa
Smith five to six hours to communicate to Gallino his Miranda rights.30 2
Dr. Vernon analogized Gallino to a million dollar computer without an
adequate program, in that Gallino has an excellent mind but a very poor
understanding of English and the abstract concepts involved.30 3
Based on the above testimony, the court in Gallino suppressed the
alleged confession. 3°
300. Id. at 23.
301. Id. at 25.
302. Id. at 27.
303. Id. at 28-29.
304. Order of Sept. 11, 1987.
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